Erich Fromm - A twentieth century prophet by Rattray, Mary
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Theses Digitisation: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ 
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
ERICH FROMM - A TWENTIETH CENTURY PROPHET?
Mary Rattray 
Thesis for the Degree of M.Th., 
Department of Biblical Studies, 
The University of Glasgow, 
April 1995. 
c Mary Rattray.
ProQuest Number: 10390503
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10390503
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
10155
fciASCOW * mrVTRSITY [nSRAIOr _ j
SYNOPSIS;
There is some evidence to show that Erich 
Fromm saw himself as a prophet, and it is argued 
that his discovery of the part played by 
authoritarian attitudes in predisposing the 
German workers to accept Fascism, was, for him, 
a revelation.
However, after a careful survey of Fromm's 
work, following his study of The Working Class in 
Weimar Germany, it would appear that Fromm fits 
more readily into the role of 'prophet as social 
critic'.
This point is made, firstly, by establishing 
that Fromm is an 'intellectual' in Edward Said's 
(1993) terms, and that, moreover, he fits neatly 
into the category of 'intellectual as social 
critic' as defined by Michael Walzer (1987).
The final step is to establish him in 
Walzer's category of 'social critic as prophet', 
and to consider the question, 'Whose prophet?'
11
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ERICH FROMM - A TWENTIETH CENTURY PROPHET?
INTRODUCTION
The idea of the 'prophet' is universally 
understood, and yet the term proves to be well- 
nigh impossible to define. Prophets are found in 
many cultures and are important in the world's 
major religions but they are also found in cults 
that are specific to a local area. While we can 
recognise a family likeness between the Old 
Testament prophets and Mohammed; or between the 
shamans of the Arctic Circle and the dervishes of 
the Arab world, it is clear that the two groups 
are far from being identical. Yet all have been 
described as prophets.
Even if we restrict our consideration to the 
prophets who were recognised as such by both Jews 
and Christians, the evidence we have in the Old 
Testament is insufficient to provide an 
unimpeachable definition of a prophet. To regard 
the Old Testament prophets simply as foretellers 
of the future is totally to misunderstand their 
purpose which was, primarily, to convey God's 
will and to persuade
to be, divinely inspired. However in Chapter
the people to repent, (though they frequently 
presented potentially catastrophic future events 
as the inevitable consequence of present and past 
behaviour). Such prophets have been described 
variously as homines reliaiosi F11. men who have 
a unique experience of God and are able to 
transmit His will to the people; others have 
understood them, first and foremost, as 
intellectuals and social critics [2]; Weber saw 
them as the first pamphleteers [3]; while, more 
recently, they have been categorised as poets
[4]. One characteristic, however, which does 
seem to be universal is their apparent need to 
proclaim their vision to the populace as a whole.
The purpose of this thesis is not to present 
Erich Fromm as one who was, or considered himself
■ÎOne, which covers Fromm's life up the publication
of Escape from Freedom (1942), it will be argued 
that the discovery of the part authoritarianism 
played in the rise of National Socialism in 
Germany in the nineteen-thirties was, for him, a 
revelation and one which he felt a compulsion, 
comparable with the prophetic experience, to
■Mr
’M,I
share with the nations of the West - at that 
time at war with Germany.
In Part Two it will be argued that the later 
texts, written in America between 1942 and 
Fromm's death in 1980, show that, thereafter, 
Fromm fitted the type of 'intellectual as social 
critic' described by Edward Said in the 1993 
Reith Lectures [51 and by Michael Walzer in 
Interpretatation and Social Criticism [61. in the 
same year.
Notes and references :
1. Lindblom, J. , Prophecy in Ancient Israel, 
Oxford, 1978, pi.
2. Walzer, Michael, Interpretation and Social 
Criticism, Harvard, 1993, Chapter 3.
3. Weber, Max, Ancient Judaism, Illinois, 1952, 
p267.
4. Carroll, Robert R.P., 'Poets not Prophets' 
J.S.O.T.. 27: pp25-31.
5. Said, Edward, Reith Lectures. BBC, 1993,
reprinted in The Independent weekly,
24th June - 29th July 1993.
6. Walzer, 1993.
CHAPTER 1 - Biographical background.
1. The formative years. 
aU9QQ-1922 .
Fromm's own upbringing can best be described 
as benevolently authoritarian. He was born in 
Frankfurt-am-Main, on 23rd March, 1900, into the 
middle-class household of a prosperous wine 
merchant. However, his father must have been the 
first to break with family tradition as we are 
told that the young Fromm was descended on both 
sides of his family from a long line of Rabbis 
and thus he received a very thorough grounding in 
the scriptures at an early age.
Though anti-semitism was reported in 
Germany during the twenties, in Beyond The 
Chains of Illusion [1962], Fromm said that he 
was not particularly aware of anti-Jewish feeling 
in his youth, though he was distressed by a 
certain 'cliquishness' that separated Jews from 
Gentiles.[1] However, this does not necessarily 
imply an absence of such prejudice at that time - 
as Landis and Tauber point out that the close, 
warm, ethical family tradition in which he was 
raised made him somewhat of a stranger in the
m o d e m  world.
'The point of view and the principles 
of the rabbinical world were in sharp 
contrast to contemporary capitalism. 
Learning and the application of the 
principles of love and justice in all 
one's relations, not wealth or power, 
were the guiding values of this 
traditional life. That was the way his 
rabbinical ancestors had lived and that 
was the style that deeply impressed 
him....In many respects Fromm grew up 
in a world closer to the middle ages 
than the twentieth century - but he was 
also part of the latter - and the 
experience of the opposition between 
the two was one of the creative forces 
of his life.' [2]
The writers of this piece are clearly 
depending upon Fromm himself for the details of 
his upbringing. There is no reason to doubt that 
his childhood was unusually sheltered nor that it 
was dominated by traditional Jewish values, given
the rabbinical influence on both sides of the 
family. However, no evidence is put forward that 
such a life was typical of Jewish families in the 
late middle ages - even then, one might suppose, 
rabbinical families adhered to the traditions 
more strictly than other contemporary households. 
Be that as it may, there seems to have been 
nothing in this kindly upbringing to lead Fromm 
to reject the authoritarianism hidden behind the 
velvet glove.
During adolescence his early training in 
Judaism was reinforced by the formal teaching of 
the Talmud under the respected Rabbi J. 
Horowitz, and as a student he came under the 
influence of several leading exponents of Jewish 
thought. These included: Nehemiah Nobel (who, he 
tells us, was 'a mystic deeply steeped in Jewish 
Mysticism as well as the thought of Western 
Humanism'), Ludwig Krause, his mother's uncle ('a 
traditionalist little touched by modern 
thought'), and Salman B . Rabinkov 
{'rooted in the Hasidic tradition, a socialist 
and a modern scholar').[3]
As a student, too, he came into contact with the
Frankfurt Lehrhaus, which had formed round the 
charismatic Nehemiah Nobel. This was a group of 
intellectuals, including Martin Buber, who were 
at the cutting edge of Jewish thought at that 
time.
No doubt, this familiarity with different 
aspects of Judaism led to the choice of topic for 
his D.Ph. thesis, which he wrote under the 
supervision of Alfred Weber in Munich. His 
thesis. The Sociology of Jewish Law (on the 
socio-psychological structure of the Jewish 
Karaites, the Hasidim and Reform Jewry) was 
completed at the age of twenty-two, at a time 
when he was still a practising Jew.
It is my contention that, although he gave 
up his religious practise soon after this, his 
early training was to colour his understanding 
for the rest of his life and, in particular, he 
never lost his early interest in the lives of the 
prophets. He makes this explicit in Beyond the 
Chains of Illusion when he explains;
'I was brought up in a religious Jewish 
family, and the writings of the Old 
Testament touched me and exhilarated me 
more than anything else.... 
but more than anything else I was moved 
by the prophetic writings, by Isaiah,
Amos, Hosea; not so much by their 
warnings and their announcement of 
disaster, but by their promise of 'the 
end of days', when 'nations shall beat 
their swords into ploughshares and 
their spears into pruning hooks....'
The vision of universal peace 
and harmony between all nations touched 
me deeply when I was twelve or thirteen 
years old.' [4]
This vision, too, was to become a recurrent 
theme in Fromm's later work.
'When the war ended in 1918, I was a
:f
■
b.The Twenties.
Since Fromm was born in 1900, this subtitle 
applies equally to his own age and to the 
historical period under discussion. Fromm had 
been fourteen at the outbreak of war, too young 
to take part, but quite old enough to be aware of 
its effects. He describes in Bevond the Chains 
of Illusion his growing disillusion and, as the 
war progressed, he became increasingly obsessed 
with the question, "How can people behave like 
this?"
He tells us : S-
deeply troubled young man who was
obsessed by the question of how the war 
was possible, by the wish to understand 
the irrationality of human mass
behaviour, by a passionate desire for 
peace and international understanding. 
More, I had become deeply suspicious of 
all official ideologies and
.declarations, and filled with the 
conviction 'of all one must doubt'. I' I have tried to show which experiences
f5
■I
i-M;
during my adolescence created the 
conditions for my passionate interest 
in the teachings of Marx and Freud.'
[5]
(It is interesting that both his great 
heroes were distinctly authoritarian. How he 
coped with this will be discussed later.)
He continued this interest through his university 
studies, which began with the study of 
psychology, philosophy and sociology at 
Heidelberg before he went on to take his D.Ph. 
under Weber. This left him well qualified in 
sociology but then he changed direction and 
undertook a course of study designed to qualify 
him to practise psychoanalysis. He studied 
psychiatry and psychology at München until 1926, 
the date that is usually given for his abandoning 
belief in God (after undergoing psychoanalysis). 
Thereafter, he began two years of training under 
Doctors Landauer and Wittenberg before moving on 
to the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute where he 
studied under such prominent Freudians as Theodor 
Reik and Hans Sachs. Thereafter, in 1931, he 
began a clinical practice.
10
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alarming rate and by 1923 the currency became 
valueless, being eventually reorganised by a 
large loan under the 'Dawes Plan' promoted by the 
American Government and the other allied 
countries.
I am indebted to Wolfgang Bonss'
materialist theory after 1918, one is
11
I:
Thus, for Fromm the whole of the decade was
■ispent in study, but in spite of this sheltered M
"'Mtexistence he must have been aware that the a
twenties were a troubled period in German 
history. From 1921 onwards Germany suffered -,
continual financial difficulties resulting in
massive unemployment, strikes, sabotage and huge istreet demonstrations. Inflation grew at an [g
1
Ïintroduction to the account he edited of Fromm's
crucial study The Working Class in Weimar Germany ||
for much of what follows.
Bonss tells us:
..yIf one looks at the development of |
struck by the growing emphasis given to 
social-psychological explanatory
concepts, which was hardly to be found gi
in Marx and his early followers....
I'
Where the labour movement in the 
nineteenth century had apparently 
repeatedly confirmed the hypothesis 
that capitalism was crisis prone and 
the victory of socialism inevitable, 
this empirical certainty had become 
increasingly fragile since the 
legalization of Social Democracy; the 
failure of the November Revolution of 
1918 finally made unmistakeably clear 
that there was nothing inevitable about 
the outcome of the theoretically 
established contradiction between the 
forces of production and the relations 
of production.' [6]
Bonss describes the rise of the SPD (Social 
Democrats) and the first stirrings of 'fascist 
and nationalist tendencies', so that increasingly 
Marxist supporters were faced with the need to 
provide an explanation of the failure of the 
revolution to materialise when the conditions for 
it seemed to be ripe.
If the outward conditions were right then the
12
explanation must lie within man himself, and so 
the explanation had to be sought in individual 
psychology.
' In so far as statements about the 
development of capitalism - that is, 
the 'objective' side of Marxist 
economic theory - had in no way been 
falsified, the reasons for the relative 
ineffectiveness of socialist campaigns 
had necessarily to reside in the 
subjective field. . . .From the start, the 
psycho-analytical theory of Freud 
assumed a prominent place....'[7]
Nevertheless, three very different responses 
to the problem can be identified. The Social 
Democrats made several attempts to adapt Freud to 
suit their purposes, though nothing very much 
came of them and Bonss tells us that these 
attempts :
' . . .are only of interest today in so
13
I I
far as the 'vulgarisation of Marxism 
and psychoanalysis is particularly 
clear' (Burian, 1972), [8]
The response of the German Communists (KPD) 
was to follow the Soviet party line. At first 
psychoanalysis was well received because it 
criticised bourgeois sexual morality, but after 
Lenin's death attitudes hardened and 
psychoanalysis was discounted.
Bonss tells us that others attempted to take up 
the middle ground;
'Several psychoanalysts such as 
Siegfried Bernfeld, Otto Fenichel or 
Wilhelm Reich who were committed to 
Marxism, although not uncritically so, 
raised their voice against this sort of 
ideological denigration: they did so
less from a party political standpoint 
than from their experience of therapy.'
{9]
Bernfeld argued that:
14
'In his view, both theories, even if
■;yautonomous in that they were concerned 
with different aspects of reality, were 
methodologically compatible and 
complemented each other, in that 
'spiritual and social life are in 
dialectical process and proper
cognition consists in the discovery of if
this dialectic' (Bernfeld,1926). [10]
By implying that Freudian theory was 
entirely materialist, Bernfeld had raised the 
question that was at the core of the debate in 
the nineteen twenties - Bonss points out that:
'If this natural science approach is 
taken to its logical conclusion, the
'Ioutcome is precarious; for, to put it 
bluntly, psycho-analysis which is 
defined as biologically orientated
individual psychology would find it J|'-'Ilargely impossible to integrate both
biological as well as non-biological g
factors, on the one hand, and f
.gK:individual as well as social factors, f
15 3i
1
  .....
on the other. But this could hardly 
have been the aim of left-wing psycho­
analysts . After all, they had set out 
to etablish a connection between 
psychology and social theory.' [11]
In spite of all this theoretical argument, 
very little objective practical investigation was
themselves!). Though more systematic inquiries, 
using the data from questionnaires, had been
(1912) was designed to explore 'the connection
16
undertaken before the foundation of the Frankfurt 
Institut [12] . Such surveys as had been done 
around the turn of the century were limited in 
scope and tended to be patriarchal in attitude 
(Bonss cites one example where employers were
yasked about the conditions of the workers, as it
was assumed that the workers would be too cf
illiterate and tongue-tied to speak for I
g
pioneered by Weber in 1910 and a later attempt
between technology and the inner life', it ran
into difficulties because, according to Bonss, it |
was not sufficiently worked out.
I
Thus, in the twenties, there was no 
successful tradition of empirical socio- 
psychological research to build on. The white- 
collar unions had collated a mass of factual 
material, but the lack of serious investigation 
into subjective attitudes and forms of behaviour 
was becoming evident. Projects to remedy this 
began to be formulated and of these the work of 
the Frankfurt Institut is the most widely known, 
though work was also being done in Vienna and 
elsewhere.
As we have seen, Fromm bore a legacy of 
interest in, and knowledge of, Judaism from the 
earlier period of his life; similarly the idea 
of marrying the work of Marx and Freud, which 
arose in the twenties, was carried forward and 
became one of the keystones of his later work.
17
2 Exile and Prophecy.
Si) The Frankfurt School
'The Institut fur Sozialforshung', to give 
the Frankfurt Institut its full title, originated 
in an idea conceived by a wealthy German 
intellectual, Felix J. Weil. Though he was never 
prominent among the scholars who formed the 
Institut, it was through the support of, first 
Weil's father, and later of Weil himself that the 
Institut became financially independent and was 
thus able to be reconstituted with relative ease 
when, after their enforced exile from Germany, a 
number of its members finally settled in New 
York.
A close friend, Friedrich Pollock, was involved 
with Weil in the original discussions, and he, in 
turn, enlisted the interest of Max Horkheimer.
Both of these men shared wider interests than 
could easily be accommodated within the tight 
single discipline regime which characterised the
f;German university system of that time. i
■*
'
'(The) idea of an independently endowed 
institute for social research seemed 
an excellent way to bypass the normal 
channels of university life.' [13]
When the Institut was formally set up, Weil 
kept financial and administrative control in his
19
I;
«II
own hands, but it was stipulated from the outset 
that the directorship should be in the hands of
a 'governmentally salaried full professor of the 
university (of Frankfurt)' [14]. Neither Pollock
nor Horkheimer were qualified for the post and 
the first director to be appointed was, in fact, 
the economist, Kurt Albert Gerlach, but, 
unfortunately Gerlach died young, in 1922, before 
the official creation of the Institut on 3rd 
February, 1923.
He was replaced by Carl Grunberg who had 
previously held the chair of law and political 
science at the University of Vienna. Grunberg 
also was a Marxist, as were the other members of 
the group, and he was: ?
I I
' in agreement with the goal of an 
interdisciplinary institute dedicated 
to the radical dissection of bourgeois 
society.' [15]
Of interest here, in view of Fromm's later 
denunciation of authoritarianism is the following 
extract from Jay's account of Grunberg's address 
of dedication:
'Grunberg continued his remarks by 
outlining the differences in 
administration that would distinguish 
the Institut from other recently
created research societies. Rather 
than collegial in leadership.... the 
Frankfurt Institut was to have a single 
director with "dictatorial" control. 
Although the independence of its
members was assured, true direction 
would be exercised in the distribution 
of the Institut's resources and the 
focussing of its energies. In
subsequent years the dominance of Max 
Horkheimer was unquestioned....
20
■at the Institut.' [16]
away from such 'unimaginative Marxism' [17] 
Jay remarks that Henryk Grossman:
'did not experience a later 
disillusionment with communism, even 
during his decade or so of exile in 
America, when many others with similar
I
Grunberg concluded his opening address 
by stating clearly his personal
'adherence to Marxism as a scientific 
methodology. Just as liberalism, state 
socialism, and the historical school 
had institutional homes elsewhere, so 
Marxism would be the ruling principle
'
Later leaders of the Institut were to move
■sÎ
backgrounds repudiated their past.' 
[18]
(Nor did Fromm, although, later, he was to 
distinguish between Marxism and the Stalinist 
communism practised in the USSR and to complain
-3
21
:
'
that Marxism had been seriously misunderstood and 
misrepresented in the West.)
Leo Lowenthal and Adorno joined the Institut 
in the late twenties . Lowenthal again came into 
contact with Erich Fromm, (whom he had known as 
a student) through the activities of the 
Frankfurt Lehrhaus as early as 1920, though, as 
will be seen, Fromm did not become a member of 
the Institut until the beginning of the thirties.
22
i
Grunberg suffered a series of strokes and 
when he was forced to retire, Horkheimer, who had 
been appointed to an extra chair in economics at 
Frankfurt, was, at last, able to become the new 
Director. It was in the concluding remarks of 
his inaugural speech that the first reference 
was made, in public, to the study upon which so 
much of Fromm's subsequent work was to be built.
'In concluding his remarks, Horkheimer |
*■’3;outlined the first task of the Institut ÿ;
under his leadership; a study of 
workers' and employees' attitudes 
towards a variety of issues in Germany I
and the rest of developed Europe. Its
I
methods were to include the use of f
public statistics and questionnaires 
backed up by sociological, ■1; vy:.-ép s y c h o l o g i c a l  and e c o n o m i c  
interpretation of the data. {19]
Horkheimer, like his predecessors, placed -s:igreat emphasis on the interdisciplinary nature of 
the Institut's work and stressed particularly the arole of social psychology as the link between
the study of the individual and the study of 
society. It was to further this aim that 
Lowenthal recruited Erich Fromm, who was 
introduced, in 1931, as one of three 
psychologists (the others were Karl Landauer and 
Hienrich Meng) who would take an active part in 
the new project. Fromm was particularly valuable 
as he was qualified in sociology, as well as 
psychoanalysis, unlike the other psychoanalysts 
whose previous training had been in medicine. 
Herbert Marcuse also joined the Institut around 
this time.
;
In 1932, when the Institut was closed for
23
3
i,'ïi
'activities hostile to the state' the members 
were to some extent dispersed - some went to 
Geneva (where an office had been established 
against just such an eventuality) others to 
London and Paris, before a smaller group (led by 
Horkeimer, and comprising Pollock, Lowenthal, 
Adorno, Marcuse and Fromm) was finally 
established in New York in the mid-thirties.
[It should be noted that Fromm's wife, Freida 
Fromm-Reichmann, did not leave Germany. She was 
not a Jew and, separated from her husband, she 
was not threatened by the Nazis.]
- The Integration of Psychoanalysis.
Long before any formal proposal was put 
forward, several Institut members, including 
Horkheimer and Lowenthal, had undergone 
psychoanalysis. Adorno, in 1927, had written a 
paper relating psychoanalysis to transcendental 
phenomenology and when the Frankfurt 
Psychoanalytic Institute was founded, in 1929, by 
Fromm and his wife, it was from the outset 
loosely connected with the Institut. Indeed it 
was through Horkheimer's influence that it was
24
accepted as a 'guest institute' of the
University of Frankfurt. According to Martin
Jay:
'Of the four permanent members (of the 
Psychoanalytic Institute), Fromm, who 
had been Lowenthal's friend for over a 
decade, and who was introduced by him 
to the Institut, soon established 
himself as its most important figure.
Only he rejoined the Institut fur 
Sozialforshung after its emigration to 
America, where he soon established 
himself as one of the most prominent of 
the so-called Freudian revisionists. . . .
It was thus primarily through Fromm's 
work that the Institut first attempted 
to reconcile Freud and Marx.' [20]
As early as the opening of the Frankfurt
25
Psychoanalytical Institute, in February 1929, 
Erich Fromm gave a lecture, which, Wolfgang Bonss
tells us, was entitled The Application of Psycho­
analysis to Sociology and Religious Knowledge, in 
which:
' .he outlined the basis for a
rudimentary but far-reaching attempt at 
the integration of Freudian psychology
-and Marxist social theory. [21]
It was several months later when the survey 
entitled German Workers 1929 - A Survey, its
Methods and Results was undertaken under Fromm's 
direction by the Institut.
'The aim of the survey planned by 
Fromm, and largely carried out by Hilde 
Weiss, was 'to gain an insight into the 
psychic structure of manual and white 
collar workers ' . With the aid of
psychoanalytical theory they were ■3i'SI
hoping to obtain evidence about the
26
character than had later enquiries'.
■3
.33;'
systematic connections between 'psychic 
make up' and social development. To 
initiate this ambitious research 
p r o g r a m m e ,  a c o m p r e h e n s i v e  
questionnaire with 271 items was 
designed and distributed to 3,300 
recipients; this was to provide the 
primary data. By the end of 1931,
Fromm and Hilde Weiss had received back 
1,100 questionnaires. [22]
The study continued to progress slowly until 
the Institut was forced to migrate to New York.
In the confusion many documents were lost,
■including a large number of completed 
questionnaires. However, in an introduction to 
Hilde Weiss' summary, Fromm wrote that:
'....they were concerned with a project 
that had 'more of an experimental
[23]
In spite of this loss, an advisory working
27
ordination of the empirical follow-up
Though Fromm was in disagreement with his
member of the Institut. However, there were
was asked to forego his remuneration. Fromm took
28
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party was set up with a view to expanding and 
translating the German findings for publication 
in America in 1935. In fact, this never happened 
as most of the group came to feel that due to 
the loss of so much raw data, they had 
insufficient evidence on which to base their 
findings.
S'
Fromm, who had also undertaken the co-
•V-îi
projects, stood firmly by the survey.
and a first report on The German Worker 
appeared within the framework of the 
publication of Authority and Family 
(HS,1935,239ff)'. [24]
co-workers, he continued for the time being as a
growing divergences between Fromm and the rest of 
the group, and the final break came, in 193 9, 
when at a time of financial crisis, Fromm who had ■
an income from his psycho-analytical practice.
...
S:ia
■S
offence and finally, after he had received 
compensation of $20,000 for the loss of his 
tenured position, he broke off his connection
with the Institut. [25]
(This was a considerable sum in 1939, and this 
incident should be borne in mind when assessing 
Fromm's later denunciation of greed in consumer 
society; whether or not the figure was a
reasonable one in the circumstances, Fromm was
not above taking financial considerations into 
account in his own case.)
That this quarrel was so bitter suggests 
that feelings were running high. However, in 
Fromm's view, the real cause of the dissension 
was not financial, but Horkheimer's refusal to 
proceed with the publication of the findings of 
the survey, and,
'When Fromm left the Institut in 1939 
the study was finally withdrawn from 
publication since, as previous director 
of the social-psychological department,
Fromm took all the relevant documents 
with him.' [26]
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iThe survey clearly had assumed a great 3?
'Fromm several times stressed that he 
did not want to offer 'proof' with his 
figures, but only to show tendencies.
'revolutionary' characters; most
importance for Fromm, yet he did not publish it 
himself, then or ever. However, thirty years 
later he gave Bonss permission to re-assemble the 
papers and to publish the survey, insofar as it 
could be reconstituted as 'a contemporary 
historical document of considerable importance' 
[27] and as 'the preliminary work for the later
Studies on Authority and Family.' [28]
In his introduction to the text Bonss tells
us :
The main tendency and therefore the
central result of the study was the 
discrepancy between manifest political 
attitudes and latent character 
structures, since, contrary to 
theoretical expectations, there were,
empirically speaking, very few purely jS;
'authoritarian', 'ambivalent'; or
'30 sI
îrespondents were inconsistent; they 
showed authoritarian attitudes in one 
attitude syndrome ; but ambivalent or 
revolutionary attitudes in another.... 
the psych o an al yt ic al ly  based 
characterology was not refined so as to 
incorporate the inconsistencies 
discovered.' [29]
This seems to give little support to Fromm's 
claims about the predominance of authoritarian 
character, but it is here that Bonss spells out
inconsistency, its existence is not in 
dispute, and this gives rise to an 
interesting new point which can help us
■
■t
I
the point that was to be the starting point for
the first of Fromm's texts written directly for 
the general public, Escape From Freedom. (1941)
'However one may seek to explain the
Î
to understand the smooth establishment 
of fascism after 1933; the outward 
verbal radicalism of the Left was
31 IÎ
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misleading with regard to the actual 
anti-fascist potential of the labour 
movement, and if one looks at the
discrepancy between manifest opinion 
and latent attitude, it seems that in 
many cases a left-wing outlook was 
neutralised or perverted by underlying 
personality traits. Fromm's conclusion 
was that despite all the electoral
successes of the Weimar Left, its
members were not in the position, owing 
to their character structure, to 
prevent the victory of National 
Socialism,' [30]
In fact, Fromm was convinced that 
authoritarian attitudes were the root cause of 
the success of the Nazis in Germany and he quotes 
John Dewey in support of his point'
' "The serious threat to our democracy," 
he says, "is not the existence of
foreign totalitarian states. It is the 
existence within our own personal
32
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attitudes and within our own 
institutions of conditions which have 
given v i c t o r y  to ext e rn al  
authority...."'[31]
This 'discovery' seems to have struck 
Fromm with all the force of a prophetic 
revelation and even if it had been possible to ■Î■iproduce the data in the form of an academic 
research report, I doubt if he would have taken
the time to write it up. More immediate was the 
need to convey his findings to the opponents of 
fascism in the West, in a form that would convey 
to as many people as possible the danger that
,was so obvious to him.
I' I feel that the psychologist should offer what he has to contribute to the 
understanding of the present crisis 
without delay....
For the understanding of the reasons 
for the totalitarian flight from 
freedom is a premise for any action 
which aims at victory over the
33
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totalitarian forces.' [32]
Hence his haste to produce the text in which 
this passage appears, which was produced in 
America in 1941 as Escape from Freedom, and in 
London, in 1942, as Fear of Freedom.
So long as he remained with the Institut, Fromm's 
publications were strictly academic, but after 
Escape From Freedom Fromm moved into what I have 
described as his 'prophetic mode' and 
concentrated on texts that were intended for a 
wider readership. There is a very marked change 
of direction, which can perhaps be accounted for 
by his sense of having been given a 'prophetic' 
message.
b) Fromm and the Prophetic Role.
There is evidence, not only that Fromm saw 
himself in the prophetic role, but that he was so 
regarded by admirers such as Marianne Horney 
Eckhart and by his most severe critic John H. 
Schaar.
In the essay Prophets and Priests, to be 
found in the posthumous volume of essays, On
34
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Disobedience and Other Essays, he gives the 
impression of first hand experience:
'It is not that a prophet wishes to be 
a prophet; in fact, only the false ones 
have the ambition to be prophets. ' [33]
In her essay, Fromm's concept of Biophilia. 
Marianne Horney Eckhart argues that Fromm's style 
is the style of the prophets;
'It is Fromm's chosen style. This 
style, as so many of his basic beliefs, 
has roots in rabbinical traditions, in 
biblical themes reinterpreted by him.
This style is that of the prophets.
Fromm described the prophets' role. 
Prophets do not predict the future.
They present reality free from the 
blindfolds of public opinion and
authority. They feel compelled to
express the voice of their conscience
35
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{
:to say what possibilities they see, to
show alternatives, to warn people. It 
is up to the people to take the warning 
and to change or to remain deaf and 
blind. Prophetic language is always 
the language of alternatives, of 
choice, of freedom. It is never that 
of determinism.' [34]
This is a clear and accurate account of 
Fromm's position; it could not be applied without 
reservation to the biblical prophets, since they 
believed their message came from YHWH. It is 
being argued here that Fromm was a prophet as he 
understood the term.
Nevertheless, Fromm shared with the Old 
Testament prophets a sense that his message was 
given :
'A prophet must talk entirely out of 
his need to tell his vision, and only 
then can his vision be trusted,' [35]
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'If however, he is motivated by the 
narcissistic wish to be a leader or 
saviour, the solidity of his message 
and the integrity of his voice are 
questionable.' [36]
This is crucial to Fromm's understanding of
contradicts the point made by Schaar in Escape 
from Authority that ;
'Fromm, unlike Marx or Mannheim, sets 
up no class which, by virtue of its 
socio-economic position can act as a
redemptive force for the whole of
-,
Escape from Freedom arose directly from Fromm's 
need to 'tell his vision'. However, the 
assumption of the prophetic role carries its own 
dangers, and Fromm was not unaware of these.
I
the role of the prophet, and it directly
society.... 1
ÏIf I understand Fromm correctly, the
initial power can only come from a
'ï37
-I'Isource outside the social system: the 
prophet, the hero, the leader ....'[37]
.
Clearly, Schaar has recognised the prophetic
'
streak in Fromm, but he is mistaken in equating 
the prophet and the leader, and concluding from 
that that Fromm must be considered as 'one who 
seeks followers'. [38]
As is evident from quotation [33] above; in 
seek his role. He is supported in this by Walzer
Fromm's view this would render his message 
invalid, since the prophet cannot deliberately
who explains that;
wrote in this vein until his death in 1980.
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'(the prophets) do not seem to have 
sought a popular following or ever to 
have aspired to political office. ' [39]
There is nothing to suggest that Fromm 
actually sought this role - though one may wonder
at the persistence with which he clung to it. He
I
:
Reverting to the call of the prophet, Fromm 
explains :
'His becoming a prophet is simple 
enough, because the alternatives he 
sees are simple enough. The prophet 
expresses this idea very succinctly:
'The lion has roared, who will not be 
afraid? God has spoken, who will not 
be a prophet?' The phrase here means
S
'Î
8simply that the choice has become
unmistakably clear. There can be no ;|l
more doubt. There can be no more
A:evasion. Hence the man who feels 
responsible has no choice but to become 
a prophet, whether he has been herding
sheep, tending his vineyards, or #developing and teaching ideas.' (My 
italics) [40] IThe last phrase surely supports the is
contention that Fromm saw himself in a prophetic 
role. This idea is supported by Fromm's 
understanding of the role of the prophet as
39
being 'to show alternatives between which to 
choose, and the consequences of those 
alternatives.' [10]
This presentation of alternatives is a 
continuing theme in Fromm's work, and indeed, it 
can be argued that he was oversimplistic in his 
reduction of life to a series of dichotomies. 
This point will be discussed more fully in later 
chapters. Similarly, it can be argued that while 
the presentation of hard choices was indeed part 
of the role of the prophet, [though the quotation 
which springs immediately to mind, ' I have set 
before you life and death.... therefore choose 
life,' comes, not from the prophets but from 
Deuteronomy 30:19] - it is not their sole
function nor even their major function, which was 
to recall man to the will of YHWH.
There were, however, some similarities 
between the situation of the Old Testament 
prophets and that of Fromm. Both prophesied in 
times of great national trouble. In a few short 
years, Fromm had seen his home country overrun by 
Fascists; his race reviled and ill-treated; he 
had been forced into exile and separated from his
40
wife, and finally found himself at odds with his 
closest colleagues. Though the full horror of 
the holocaust and Horoshima were not yet known, 
he was not alone in his sense of impending 
disaster. Once he thought he had discerned a 
clue to the way forward, it was well within the 
line of his character and upbringing that he i'should feel impelled to make his discovery 
widely known. Though he had ostensibly
given up religious practice and belief, he had 
been so well trained in Jewish ways of thinking 
in his youth, that it was impossible to break
free, and it remained a factor in his mature !'S
thought for the remainder of his life. fS
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CHAPTER 2 Fromm and Religion
After Escape from Freedom Fromm
continued to write for the general public, while 
pursuing a career in psychoanalysis both as a 
practitioner and as a teacher. He was a member 
of the Faculty at Bennington College (1941-49) 
and Guest Professor at Yale (1948-49) before 
moving, because of the illness of his second 
wife, to Mexico. There he became first, 
Professor, then Honorary Professor of the 
National Autonomous University of Mexico. 
However, throughout his time there, he commuted 
to New York and Michigan, where he also held 
chairs. In addition, he was a founder member of 
the Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry, 
Psychoanalysis and Psychology.
His next book, Man for Himself (1947), gave 
an account of Fromm's understanding of the 
development of character and was to an extent a 
continuation of the argument in Escape from 
Freedom (1941) providing a fuller explanation of 
how the authoritarian character is formed. The 
Sane Society (1955) set out for the first time 
Fromm's vision of the ideal society, based on
46
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VIÏSÏMarxian ideas, but in between came two texts with 'ia religious theme viz; Psychoanalysis and
Religion (1950) and The Forgotten Language (1952) y
"fwhich dealt with myth and legend.
As one reads through Fromm's work it soon 
becomes evident that the utopian structure that 
he was building had three main supports. These 
were: his religious background; his admiration
for Marx; and a continuous internal 
dialogue/argument with Freud. It is proposed, ;|
therefore, to take each of these in turn, in 
order to extract the part each played in the 
overall theory that Fromm was developing.
1. Fromm’s religious thought:
'Fromm has written, at length, on his 
understanding of the scriptures in You Shall Be 
As Gods,f1966 ^ though references to the prophets ■Iare scattered throughout his work. While it is 
clear that he has moved a considerable distance 
from traditional Jewish thinking, it is not clear î!Ihow far he was out of step with contemporary |
avant-garde Jewish thought. A comparison with
the work of Martin Buber and other members of the
Frankfurt Lehrhaus would be helpful here. v|
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However, these men, as we have seen, were 
pioneers of Jewish thinking and were probably not 
typical of mainstream rabbinical thought.
Certainly, by the time You Shall Be As Gods 
was written, 'God', for Fromm, had become an 
unnecessary construct.
'I believe that the concept of God was 
a historically conditioned expression 
of an inner experience.' [1]
Nevertheless, this inner experience, which he 
described as the 'x ' experience, continued to be 
important to Fromm, as is evidenced by his 
interest in Zen Buddhism and the Christian 
mystics.
However, in this section it will be argued 
that, at the very least, he brought from Judaism 
to his consideration of Marx and Freud;
48
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a) A set of values gained early in life.
.in the prophets from Amos onwards,
49
b) An understanding of the prophetic role, 
and, most vitally,
c) An aim - that of the achievement of the 
messianic time. I
a) Values.
Fromm identifies the prime values in the 
teaching of the prophets as being those of 
justice and love:
we find the same concept. What man has
ito do is to acquire and to practice 
the main qualities that characterise 
God: justice and love (rahamin). [2]
Later he amplifies this, and the addition, 
as will become evident, is crucial to Fromm's 
thought : I
ÏI■i
Î
'.-a
'The spirit of the law as it was 
developed, by the rabbis through the 
centuries, was one of brotherly love 
for the individual, and the devotion of 
one's life to one's human development.' 
r31 (My italics.)
Fromm had a long experience of rabbinic 
teaching, so this last (italicised) phrase may 
well be true, but Fromm offers no evidence for it 
and it is certainly not part of the prophetic 
message as this is commonly understood.
As we have seen, Landis and Tauber 
considered that love of learning, as well as 
justice and love, was an essential part of 
Fromm's upbringing. A keen sense of social 
justice derives directly from the prophets [see, 
for example, Amos Chapter eight]; and, in 
addition, the prophets shared with Marx an 
interest in the historical process:
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f' It must be added that God acts in
history and reveals himself in history. 
This idea has two consequences: one,
that belief in God implies a concern 
with history and, using the word in its 
widest sense, a political concern. We 
see this political concern most clearly 
in the prophets .... the prophets think 
in historical and political terms.
"Political" here means that they are
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concerned with historical events
affecting...all the nations of the
world. It means, furthermore, that the 
criteria for judging historical events 
are spiritual religious ones: justice
and love.' [4]
The concept of a God who reveals himself in 
history is straightforwardly Jewish, and the 
teachings of the prophets were political insofar 
as the prophets spoke directly to the leaders of 
their time and demanded change in, for example, 
the treatment of the poor, as we have seen that 
Amos did, or gave direct advice to the king, as 
Isaiah did to Ahaz. (Isaiah Chapter 7).
Though Fromm, at the time of writing, had 
discounted the need for God and become imbued 
with the ideas of Marx - the ethical teaching of 
his youth regarding the primacy of justice stays 
in place and finds expression in his democratic, 
or communitarian socialism. [5]
Similarly, he considers that brotherly love 
is an essential pre-requisite for the achievement 
of man's full potential, and it is important to 
recognise that the biblical understanding of love 
was well-established as part of his belief system 
long before he arrived at his theoretical 
position in The Art of Loving. f 1957 ) Since 
Schaar has written scathingly on this subject, it 
is necessary to define just what Fromm's position 
was - Fromm saw love as an art, which like any 
other art required a mastery of both theory and 
practice, though his theory seems, at times, to 
be unnecessarily complex and confusing. This is 
because, with Fromm, everything has to be made to 
fit into the strange mixture of Marxism, 
Freudianism and Godless religion that forms his 
central thesis. This will become evident as 
this work progresses.
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However, no-one who has read Fromm’s text 
can imagine that love is ever easy, it is an act 
of will that requires humility, courage, faith, 
and discipline - as well as care, responsibility, 
respect and knowledge - all of which, in Fromm’s 
thought, are aspects of the mature character or 
the productive personality.
love of the Bible is plainly not that of Erich 
Fromm’ [6] is wilfully to misunderstand Fromm’s
after all the stringent elements of
Ï
To say, as Schaar does, that 'the brotherly
.I
position, as is his claim that:
'In Fromm's pages, Christian love 
appears only as a bland residue of 
sympathy and benevolence left over
duty, debt and sacrifice have been left 
out.' [7]
Î
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This claim is possible only if one accepts 
Schaar's own divergent understanding of the term, 
which is that normal human love is restricted, 
rationed and particular, and that
' it must remain secret and mysterious, 
the talent and the privilege of the 
few'. [8]
However Schaar is right in pointing out the 
ambivalent nature of love :
' to praise love in the style of 
Fromm is in our day to run the risk of 
adding to a debased conception of love 
as the right to be accepted as one 
is ' [9]
This is the obverse side of unconditional 
love; such love can be made available only as a 
gift - it cannot be argued for as a right. This 
illogical situation is acceptable only in terms 
of faith, which Fromm understood as a function of 
character, but nowhere does he make his position 
clear on this.
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(Fromm, like Freud, places great importance on 
the formation of character, but, as will become 
evident, gives a differing account of its 
development.)
The idea of the devotion of one's life to 
one's human development is crucial to Fromm's 
thinking, and his psychoanalytical practice has 
this as its main objective. He argues (in 
quotation 3 above) that this was part of 
traditional Jewish thinking; if this is so, this 
idea predates his encounter with Marx and Freud.
In You Shall Be As Gods, particularly, we 
find the interplay between Fromm's biblical 
background and his later psychoanalytical 
studies. God is seen as being the
personification of the highest good, but what 
that is perceived as being is dependent on the 
character of the individual and, therefore, the 
concept of God varies with the maturity of the 
individual.
Here, as elsewhere, Fromm introduces the 
opposition between the authoritarian and the 
humanistic viewpoint; between patriarchal and 
matriarchal views of religion; and between 
rational and irrational faith ~ supporting the
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second alternative in each case. The first and 
last of these attributes will be discussed more 
fully in the context of Fromm's understanding of 
character (see Man for Himself 1947). This 
discussion follows later. Meanwhile it should be 
noted that (not for the first, or only, time) 
Fromm creates difficulty for himself by trying to 
unite Jewish monotheism with atheistic Marxism. 
By asserting his own disbelief in God, he cannot 
escape the fact that the biblical prophets, whom 
he recommends, do believe in a paternalistic God 
and issue an authoritarian message.
As it happens, Fromm's understanding of the 
contrast between patriarchal and matriarchal 
accounts of religion arose from his study of 
Bachofen - an account of which appears in Martin 
Jay's study of the Frankfurt Institut:
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'Bachofen's psychological insights on 
the other hand, were the source of the 
appeal to the left. Matriarchal 1society stressed human solidarity and 
happiness. Its dominant values were ■■Ilove and compassion, not fear and
subordination. Both private property ;i
t
Freudian paternalism,
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':r.Tand repressive sexuality were absent 
from its social ethic. Patriarchal 
society, as Engels and Bebel had 
interpreted it, was related to a class 
society; both stressed duty and 
authority over love and gratification. '
[10] I
It xs this reading of Bachofen that is coherent ■wwith Fromm's thought, but it led him further from |
a 
■[According to Jay, eventually Fromm's criticism -Iof Freud was to lead to his separation from the
Frankfurt School altogether; but as we have seen, 
Bonss gave an entirely different account of the 
break-up, blaming it on disagreements over the 
attitudinal survey. No doubt, several factors 
were involved - all the remaining members of the
I
Institut must have been undergoing a degree of 
stress at that time.]
Martin Jay tells us :
'At the same time as Fromm's 
disillusionment with Freud grew, so did 
his estrangement from other members of 
the Institut.... Fromm wrote only one 
more article for the Zeitschrift, a 
study of the feeling of impotency in 
modern society. In 1939 his connection 
with the Institut was severed. . . . ' [11]
b) The Prophets.
Fromm's understanding of the role of the 
prophet, as one who sees the evil of his own time 
and presents man with alternatives, derives from 
his own, selective, reading of the Scriptures. 
Referring to the prophets he writes :
'...they have a fourfold function:
1. They announce to man that there is 
God, the One who has revealed himself 
to them, and that man's role is to 
become fully human: and that means to 
become like God.' (My italics) [12]
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those who cannot follow him in discarding the 
idea entirely. Thus, by describing God as ' a
The insertion of the idea that man's role is 1
to become like God is a typically Frommian 
formulation, as he seeks to keep the ethical 
content of the Old Testament while rejecting the 
traditional understanding of God.
Traditional believers would find something very 
odd in Fromm's attempts to keep all the functions 
of the prophet except the one that they consider 
essential, that is, that God exists and that the y|
prophetic message comes from Him. He seems to be 
throwing out the baby and carefully preserving lithe bathwater! Nevertheless he is attempting to 
come to grips with a contemporary problem in 
terms a layman can understand - belief in a
Isupernatural God is difficult, but the ethical 
superstructure is valuable - how can we keep one 
without the other?
Fromm tries to do this by playing down the
.
importance of God while leaving the door open for |
historically conditioned expression of an inner 
experience' [13] which he does not share, he 
leaves open the possibility that others have had ■J|the experience. Alternatively he can accept the
«
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term as a poetic expression of 'the highest value 
in humanism, not a reality in itself'. [14] As 
we will see in the final chapter a less tortured 
way of achieving his end would be simply to 
accept the importance of the prophetic narratives 
in the formation of the moral culture of the 
West.
To return to his second point;
'They, (the prophets) show man
alternatives between which he can 
choose, and the consequences of those 
alternatives. They often express this 
in terms of God's rewards and
punishment, but it is always man who, 
by his own action, makes the
choice.'[15]
All too often, by the time the prophet speaks the 
choice has already been made. In When Prophecy 
Failed, Robert P. Carroll points out that:
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’A classical example of a domain 
assumption must be Jeremiah's belief 
that everybody in Jerusalem and Judah 
was completely corrupt, wicked and 
incapable of becoming otherwise. 
(Jeremiah 5.1-5; 6.13; 8.4-7; 9.4-5;
13.23) [16]
3. 'They dissent and protest when man
takes the wrong road. But they do not 
abandon the people ; they are their 
conscience, speaking up when everybody 
else is silent.'[17]
This identification of the prophets with their 
people is important to Walzer's definition of the 
prophet (see final chapter) .
4. 'They do not think in terms of
individual salvation only, but believe 
that individual salvation is bound up 
with the salvation of society. Their 
concern is the establishment of a 
society governed by love, justice, and 
truth; they insist that their politics
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must be judged by moral values, and
that the function of political life is 
the realisation of those values.' [18]
The word 'only' here is superfluous. It suggests 
that the prophets' message is, in part, about 
individual salvation - this is not the case as 
the prophet speaks invariably about the salvation 
of the people as a whole.
As Fromm sees it, man is endowed with
tendencies towards both good and evil and must 
make a conscious choice between the two. He 
quotes (in You Shall Be As Gods) Deuteronomy 
30.19 "See, I have set before you life and death, 
blessing and curse, therefore choose life...'
(In fact, much of his following argument seems to
be based more on Deuteronomy than directly from
the prophets, however, - since the exact 
relationship between Deuteronomy and the prophets 
seems to be far from clear and the teachings of 
the two have much in common - this may not be a 
crucial point).
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to change its ways, the individuals who comprise 
the nation will each have to change, his argument 
is not necessarily invalid.
1
Be that as it may, the admonition to 'choose 
life' is elaborated in The Heart of Man (1964) 
and The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (1973) yf
as the choice between 'biophilia and necrophilia' 
which, also, will be considered later as part of •II
:
'si
:the discussion of Fromm's development of Freudian 
psychology.
Faced with the problem of freedom or "à
determinism, he takes a position between the two 
and opts for his own formulation of 
'alternativism', where man does have the ability 
to choose between good and evil (since he has the 
potential for either) but, nevertheless, this 
freedom can be lost if an individual's 
development is limited or if it is distorted by 
too many wrong choices so that he reaches the 
point of no return. 'Alternativism' is related 
in You Shall Be As Gods to prophetic choices. As
%we have seen, this will not do - since !■alternativism is concerned with individual 
choices and the prophets are speaking to the 
whole people. However, since if the nation is 'I
; 
;
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'They (the prophets) teach that there 
is nothing inherently evil in man's 
nature that would prevent him choosing 
the good which is in him as a 
potentiality, just as is the evil' [19]
It would have been helpful if Fromm had given 
examples from the prophets here, but presumably 
his argument is that there would have been no 
point to the prophetic message if human beings 
had not had the ability to do better.
'The idea that man is free to choose 
between good and evil and may yet lose
this capacity for choice is expressed
;>■in the prophetic writings. They share 
the view that man can lose himself to
the point of no return. Thus, while
sthey announce alternatives, in a number
of instances they have predicted I
unalterable disaster.' [20]
AH'?
aware of since his youth.)
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,-fi(The explanation of 'alternativism' is set out in ;f
detail in the final chapter of The Heart of Man.
(1964) It is interesting to speculate how far 
Fromm's ideas on this subject were prompted by 
the need to solve this contradiction in the
y'ïl
,1
teaching of the prophets, which he must have been
Fromm argues that the essence of man lies in 
his 'essential dichotomy', (See below) and in the 
questions this raises - in particular, how is man 
to overcome his separateness? He can do this 
regressively, by attempting to return to nature; 
or progressively, by moving toward a fuller |
humanity. Full humanity will be achieved in the 
messianic time, but until then each man should 
strive for greater maturity. Meanwhile the
choice is there, inescapably, and must be
accepted for good or evil, regress or progress. S
iAmong the choices he finds in the
scriptures, and in addition to those mentioned
above, are those of nationalism versus li
universality; conservatism versus radicalism; and 
fanaticism versus tolerence - in each case, as a
A
I
radical humanist he would see the second option 
as being the progressive option. But he really 
cannot argue, as he tries to do, that this would 
be the position of the prophets - again and again 
we find the prophets fanatically denouncing other 
nations (Isaiah 13 ;15 ; 17 ; 18 ; 19 ;) nor is tolerance 
one of their outstanding virtues, since their 
language is almost entirely that of strong 
denunciation.
Yet he needs to make this point if he is to 
make good the assumption underlying his text, 
that radical humanism 'marks the main stages of 
the evolution of the Jewish tradition'. [21] 
Though he admits that a much longer text would be 
needed to make this fully evident, it is clear 
that this is the understanding upon which his 
present work is based.
c ) The Messianic Time.
Fromm believes in evolution - yet he 
invariably uses the biblical story of creation to 
explain his theory of the nature of man. In his 
account - over a long period of time, man evolved
66
to the point where, because of the growth of his 
intellect and the consequent reduction of his 
powers of intuition, he became irreparably 
separated from the rest of nature. He equates 
this with man's expulsion from Paradise. 
According to Fromm, only Christians see man's 
expulsion as a reward for sin - Jews regard it 
more positively as an act of disobedience, which 
was at the same time man's first act of freedom 
and the first step along a long road to his full 
development in the messianic time, when universal 
peace will reign and man will be reunited with 
nature.
'Seen from the point of view of 
biblical philosophy, the process of 
history is the process in which man 
develops his powers of reason and love, 
in which he becomes fully human, in 
which he returns to himself. He 
regains.... the harmony of a man 
completely aware of himself, capable of 
knowing right and wrong, good and evil'
[21]
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(It might be safer to replace the first phrase 
with 'Seen from the standpoint of Frommian 
philosophy....')
However, Fromm continues;
'The messianic time is the next step in 
history, not its abolition..(it) is the
time when man will have been fully 
born.' [22]
Fromm argues that progress towards the messianic 
time is brought about by the tensions inherent in 
'man's essential dichotomy'
'This dichotomy creates conflict and 
suffering, and man is driven to find 
ever new solutions to this conflict, 
until he has solved it by becoming 
fully human and achieving at-one-ment ' . 
[23]
I
fThis explanation of man's nature as being the result of this 'existential dichotomy' underlies 
all Fromm's thinking and makes its appearance in
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the same form in all his work, (See the very full 
explanation in The Sane Society) [24]
It is probable that this understanding, 
which is crucial to Fromm's thought, arises from 
a conflation of the concept of the messianic time 
with the ideas of Marx, who also promoted an 
ideal of self-development.
However the idea of the messianic time as a time 
of peace and brotherhood is standard biblical 
teaching;
' . . .the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, 
and the leopard shall lie down with the 
kid, and the calf and the lion and the 
fatling together, and a little child 
shall lead them....
They shall not hurt or destroy in all 
my holy mountain; for the earth shall 
be full of the knowledge of the Lord as 
the waters cover the sea.' Isaiah 
11:6-9
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Fromm quotes this passage in You Shall Be As Gods 
together with other passages relating to a future 
time when man will live in harmony with nature. 
In Bevond the Chains of Illusion (1952) he quotes 
it in conjunction with the passage from Isaiah 
2:4 when nations,
'...shall beat their swords into 
ploughshares and their spears into 
pruning hooks: nation shall not lift
sword against nation, neither shall 
they learn war any more'
and the influence of the early teaching he 
received as a child is evident when he adds,
'The vision of universal peace and 
harmony touched me deeply when I was 
between twelve and thirteen years old. '
[25]
From the prophetic description of the 
messianic time, Fromm draws the values of freedom 
and harmony, (between man and man, and between 
man and nature) . His interest in harmony between
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man and nature is consistent with his admiration 
for Schweitzer and his interest in Buddhism (Zen 
Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, 1960), but, more 
importantly, it clearly forms the basis of his 
lifelong pacifism. He was a consistent upholder 
of the cause of internationalism and of the anti- 
nuclear movement, while the clearest expression 
of his criticism of American foreign policy and 
the account of the dangers he foresaw in the 
international situation are to be found in May 
Man Prevail (1961),
[Like almost everyone else, he failed to predict 
the sudden break up of the communist bloc and it 
is interesting to speculate on what would have 
been his reaction to the collapse of the Berlin 
wall and subsequent events. Throughout his exile 
he retained a profound distrust of Germany. 
Given his experience, this is understandable, but 
the possibility of rationalisation on his part 
has to be borne in mind when he describes Germany 
as incurably expansionist.) [26]
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2. Fromm's Theology.
Fromm traces the development of God from the 
omniscient, all-powerful and arbitrary ruler, 
through the Jewish understanding of a covenant 
with God, and, finally, to the concept of freedom 
from God.
'God' was the concept used to describe an 
experience. Thus, at the outset, he defines his 
own position:
' I have tried to show that the God- 
concept is only "the finger that points 
to the moon" . This moon is not outside 
of ourselves but is the human reality 
behind the words : what we call the
religious attitude is an ' x ' that is 
expressible only in poetic and visual 
symbols'. [27]
This understanding of God is perhaps more 
familiar today than it was at the time this was 
written, nevertheless, in most of what follows, 
Fromm is reading his own philosophy into the 
Bible.
i
72
powers of reason, love, compassion, and courage.
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The difference between ethical man and the 
religious man is not a question of belief in a 
form of words used to describe the indescribable, 
it is a matter of character and lies essentially 
in the difference between authoritarian and 
humanitarian attitudes (see later discussion).
In Fromm's view 'authoritarian ethics are 
always tinged with idolatry' [28] whereas 
humanitarian ethics ±s consistent with the 'x' 
experience - but whether one describes this in 
theistic or non-theistic terms depends on one's 
conceptualisation of the experience. The
experience is the same however it is described.
Whatever the name given to the experience, Fromm 
suggests that certain factors are characteristic 
of those who participate in it:
1. They experience life as a problem and 
seriously seek to overcome the essential 
dichotomy posed by life and seek at-one-ment.
2. They seek the highest development of their own
j
4. They seek openness through letting go of the 
ego.
■
3. For an ' x ' person, man alone is an end and 
never a means, 'each event is responded to from
the standpoint of whether or not it helps to 
transform him in the direction of becoming more
human'.[29]
'to make oneself empty does not express 
passivity but openness. Indeed, if one 
cannot make oneself empty, how can one 
respond to the world? How can one see, 
feel, hear, love, if one is filled with 
one's ego, if one is driven by greed?' 
[30]
Though we invariably try to conceptualise or find 
symbols to convey religious experience, there are 
dangers in doing so.
■I
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' The concept and the symbol have the 
great advantage that they permit people 
to communicate their experiences ; they 
have the tremendous disadvantage that 
they lend themselves easily to 
alienated use.' [31]
This, in Fromm's view is exactly what 
happened - the concept and the experience became 
separated (alienated) and, because of the social 
structure of the time, with the mass of the 
people dominated by powerful leaders and kings, 
God was conceptualised in terms of supreme power.
'...the concept 'god' was conditioned 
by the presence of a sociopolitical 
structure in which tribal chiefs or 
kings have supreme power. The supreme 
value is conceptualised as analogous to 
the supreme power in society.' [32] I
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Given Fromm's view of authoritarianism, it 
is not surprising that he found this view 
untenable. He also found it unnecessary, as he 
considered that it is possible to undergo a
religious experience without necessarily 
interpreting it in traditional theistic terms, 
hence the current interest in Zen Buddhism and 
Taoism; ■i■
•>:'The East, however, was not burdened ?
with the concept of a transcendent 
f ather-saviour in which the 
monotheistic religions expressed their 
longings. Taoism and Buddhism had a
.rationality and realism superior to 
that of the Western religions. They 
could see man realistically and
■j-f
objectively, having nobody but the J
'awakened' ones to guide them, and laî;being able to be guided because each Jman has within himself the capacity to ^■iawake and be enlightened.' [33] ■ aa
%
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constituted the first stage of man's 
understanding of God, Fromm saw it as being 
counterbalanced by the idea that man was God's 
potential rival. If he had eaten of the fruit of 
the tree of life as well as the fruit of the tree
Î
If the idea of God as an absolute ruler
of knowledge he would have attained immortality 
and become the equal of God - hence his expulsion 
from the garden - but the potentiality remains.
'As we shall see, the more man unfolds, 
the more he frees himself from God's 
supremacy, and the more he can become 
like God.' [34]
God's covenant with Noah marks a decisive step 
forward,
'The idea of a covenant constitutes, 
indeed, one of the most decisive steps 
in the religious development of 
Judaism, a step which prepares the way 
to the concept of the complete freedom 
of man, even freedom from God.' [35]
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When man strikes a bargain with God, he does 
so, necessarily, from a position of near 
equality. From there the next step leads to a 
position of complete equality. But if man is the 
equal of God - the concept of God becomes 
superfluous. Thus, he understood ’godless 
religion' to be a logical development from the 
Jewish tradition of 'the nameless god' . However, 
the term YHWH was not adopted because God had no 
name, rather because it was too holy to be 
uttered - so that Fromm's argument was based on 
a misreading. (See, for example. Exodus 20.2 
when the expression 'I am the Lord, your God', 
could equally have been translated, 'I am 
Yahweh...')
'There is a common element of 
experience referred to by the concept 
of God, but there is also a constant 
change occurring in this experience and 
hence in the meaning of the word and 
concept.
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What is common...( is ) that there is 
only the ONE who represents the supreme 
value and the supreme goal for man: the 
goal of finding union with the world 
through full human development of his 
specifically human capacities of love 
and reason.' [36]
This may be an admirable aim, but it is not 
biblical. Nevertheless, it is this goal which is 
at the heart of all Fromm's subsequent writing, 
from Escape from Freedom (1941) to The Art of 
Being. (1993}.
He repeatedly asserts that the Scriptures do 
not attempt to describe God, in fact they firmly 
discourage any attempt to do so. For
second Isaiah, God is incomparable,
'To whom then will you liken God.
Or what likeness compare with him...'
(Isaiah 40.18)
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However the Scriptures do lay stress on what 
God is NOT and the prophets, in particular, are 
less interested in theology than in discouraging 
idolatry. (Isaiah 44. 9-20)
'An idol represents the object of man's 
central passion: the desire to return 
to the soil mother, the craving for 
possession, power, fame and so forth.
The passion represented by the idol is, 
at the same time, the supreme value 
within man's system of values....
The history of mankind up to the 
present time is primarily the history 
of idol worship, from the primitive 
idols of clay and wood to the modern 
idols of the state, the leader, 
production and consumption - sanctified 
by the blessing of an idolised God.'
[ 3 7 ]
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3 .Fromm's concerns, 
a)Alienation.
Fromm's views on alienation were shared with 
other members of the Frankfurt School, as they
with Freud's psychoanalytic theory
81
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As Professor Carroll has pointed out, in his 
supervisory capacity, this is pure homily. There 
is a place for homily, and arguably it is not 
out of place in a popular text, but You Shall Be
3As Gods is less 'popular' in style than many of 
Fromm's works.
According to Fromm, the worship of any idol 
invariably serves to reduce or weaken the powers 
of the individual. True worship by whatever 
name, will always promote the growth of the self 
in the direction of freedom, love and the mature
■ Mproductive character. Through the concept of 
idolatry we find Fromm raising many of the 
concerns with which he is preoccupied in his 
writings.
:
s 1pursued their aim of marrying the idea of Marxism
'The Hegelian-Marxian concept of 
alienation makes its first appearance - 
though not in these words - in the 
biblical concept of idolatry. Idolatry 
is the worship of the alienated, 
limited qualities of man. The
idolater, just as the alienated man, is 
the poorer the more richly he endows 
his idol. [38]
This understanding of alienation is discussed in
the following section.
b)Freedom.
'God in the Bible and in the later 
tradition allows man to be free; he 
reveals to him the goal of human life, 
the road by which he can reach this 
goal; but he does not force him to go 
in either direction. It could hardly 
be otherwise in a religious system in
which the highest norm for man's
development is freedom'. [39]
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This, again, is a typical Frommian 
formulation. God in the Bible has always been 
regarded as leaving man free to choose between 
good and evil, but the rest does not necessarily 
follow.
In Fromm's thought, people indoctrinated by 
an authoritarian, paternalistic culture are 
afraid of freedom, and thus lack the resources to 
make independent decisions, and Fromm does 
provide some backing for this idea in Fear of 
Freedom.
In The Revolution of Hope . (1968) Fromm
explains the psychological reasons for 'belief in 
idols and political leaders' as being the 
outcome of man's need for certainty and for 
conformity. The ability to stand apart from the 
herd, as the prophet must do, is a humanistic, 
rather than an authoritarian characteristic. 
However, as has already been pointed out, the 
prophets carried the message of a paternal, 
authoritarian God, and could not conceivably be 
described as humanistic.
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c) Contemporary Idols.
’Once idols were animals, trees, stars, 
figures of men and women....Today they 
are called honor, flag, state, mother, 
family, fame, production and many other 
names. But because the official object 
of worship is God, the idols of today 
are not recognised for what they 
are....Hence we need an idology that 
would examine the effective idols of 
any given period....how they have been 
syncretised with the worship of God, 
and how God himself has become one of 
the idols...' [40]
As with so much of Fromm, there is a grain of 
truth in this, insofar as we are able to accept 
that God represents our highest value - that 
which we worship. Then to worship anything 
less, is to make of it a substitute for God, that 
is, an idol. It can be argued that the main 
purpose of Fromm's work is to provide such an 
idology.
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d) Pacifism.
'Is there really as much difference as 
we think between the Aztec human 
sacrifices and the modern human 
sacrifices in war to the idols of 
nationalism and the sovereign state?' .
[41]
It has to be remembered that Fromm was old enough 
to have been profoundly disturbed by the mass 
slaughter, on both sides, of the First World War. 
At the time of writing there are many conflicts, 
world wide, all of which seem unnecessary, seen 
from the outside. Moreover, Fromm's lifetime 
covered the period of both World Wars, Korea, and 
Vietnam and he would have had friends and 
students involved in all of these. It is not 
surprising that he equates war with Moloch.
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4) Conclusion.
Several main planks in Fromm's philosophy 
can be shown to be closely linked to ideas drawn 
from his early Jewish upbringing, albeit often 
illicitly adapted to suit his own purposes - 
among them being:
1. The concept of idolatry, which derives, 
obviously, from Fromm's early training in the 
Jewish Scriptures. In his estimation the worship 
of false gods is at the heart of all human ills 
and the idea permeates all of his writing. 
Idolatry and alienation, as we have seen are 
inseparable, and the topic must recur continually 
in any discussion of Fromm's work.
2. The idea of man's essential dichotomy, which, 
perhaps more than any other factor, conflates the 
teachings of Fromm's youth with his mature 
thinking. At a conscious level he is dealing 
with myth, yet he discusses the myth and draws 
conclusions from it as if it were fact. [In a 
similar manner Christians discuss the story of 
'the Good Samaritan' as if it was fact, although, 
even if the Gospel story is accurate, the man was
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*an imaginary figure created by Jesus to 
illustrate a point.] This does not necessarily 3$%
invalidate Fromm's thesis that man's disease in
1
the world arises from his development away from 
the certainties of the instinctual behaviour of 
animals, and the choices that the development of 
his intellect have placed upon him - but it must 
create difficulties for those who are not equally
immersed in the biblical tradition. j
3. Fromm's, mistaken, claim that there is SI;
biblical authority for the stress he puts on the 
ideal of self development. This is not the case, %
as the idea is almost entirely absent from the 
bible - the concept is a modern one which is 
necessary to support Fromm's humanist position.
What is interesting here is to note the length to
which Fromm, the humanist, will go to find M
biblical support for his ideas. It suggests that àhis early training is a powerful component of his 
mature philosophy. -I'
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4. Fromm's insistence that man is capable of both 
good and evil seems experientially self-evident, 
but in view of religious accounts of man's innate 
depravity, and more recent accounts of 
inescapable aggression in, for example. The Naked 
Ape [42] it is a position that needs to be
defended. Not only that, but in view of Schaar's
attack -
'We come again to the basic point.
Fromm believes that a good society will
make good men and that evil men are
merely the unnatural reflections of 
evil social conditions.' [43]
- the argument that Fromm, in fact, held the 
view that mankind is capable of evil - is also in 
need of defence. Fromm discusses his belief that 
man has to choose between good and evil in the 
final chapter of The Heart of Man (1964), and 
defends his stance against those who regard 
humans as being incurably aggressive in The 
Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (1973). Both of 
these texts are discussed in later chapters.
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He is not, however, overly optimistic ~ he 
sees contemporary conditions as favouring the 
evil, rather than the good, in man.
5, Fromm's account of the role of the prophet
89
However the issue of the choices that life places 
before us is central to much of the discussion of 
Fromm's psychology which is the subject of |;
chapter four.
■IIit 
'Iwho, in a troubled situation, and because he is
j
I
Is
one of the few who are sufficiently developed to 
see the alternatives, has a duty to point these 
out to his fellows - in the hope of bringing 
about a change of direction before it is too 
late. This is clearly the role in which Fromm 
saw himself. Fromm is here taking the myth of 
the prophet, as the intellectual who stands for 
justice and righteousness, against current 
trends, at whatever cost, as the basis of his 
argument - rather than a careful examination of
„ilthe biblical text which would not support many of :îhis claims.
;
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rationalize after the event.
Certain values, such as those of love and
90
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aiOverall, although Fromm attempts to give
"'isome formal biblical backing to his general |
thesis in You Shall Be As Gods. this is to ft
1  
4
justice, had been so ingrained in his youth that ft
he would have been incapable of devising any jft
theory of man in which they were not included.
Moreover his insistence on 'the devotion of one’s ftl-■'ilife to one's human development', (which he v;ft
insists is biblical but for which we have been 
able to find no evidence in the prophets), if
translated simply as 'the need to make the most
of one's talents' immediately brings to mind the
ftlI
parable of Jesus which seeks to make just that
'"ftpoint.
Fromm was not a Christian, but Jesus was a Jew,
and there is evidence that many of his teachings 
were traditional Rabbinical doctrine. This may
s';well be one of the lessons which were insisted -s;;
upon in the upbringing of a very bright Jewish ft
child - to the extent that for Fromm it became an
unacknowledged article of faith, which must be 
incorporated with the other values into his final 
theory.
ft
:
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CHAPTER 3
The Influence of Freud and Marx.
Just as what Jay has described as 'Fromm's 
religiosity' derives from the earliest period of 
his life, so his interest in Freud and Marx can 
be linked to his second decade and to the efforts 
being made at that time to combine Freudian 
psychology with Marxism. Indeed, Fromm's thought 
was so influenced by them that it has been 
suggested that, if Fromm was a prophet, he was a 
failed prophet of Marx and Freud. This challenge 
will be taken up in the final chapter, but, 
prophet or not, he was certainly a disciple of 
Marx. His relationship with Freud, as we shall 
see, was less straightforward.
In Bevond the Chains of Illusion (1962), 
which could be described as an autobiographical 
account of Fromm's thinking up to that date, he 
tries to explain, in terms that a layman might 
understand, the similarities and differences 
between Freud and Marx and how these had affected 
his own thinking.
I
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■iThough this chapter is largely based on that
Itext, I have ranged more widely throughout
‘DïîFromm's work to expand on some of the points 
made.
He had previously written (in 1955) Sigmund 
Freud's Mission, which was largely devoted to an 
attack on Freud and his followers, and (in 1961)
Marx's Gospel of Man (to which one might be 
forgiven for adding, 'as Fromm saw it'). As will
historical significance with whom Freud 
cannot even be compared in this respect 
hardly needs to be said.' [1]
IÎbe seen, Fromm was as capable of reading what he
wanted to find in Marx, as he was of giving his
'"Mown interpretation to the Bible. Yet, overall, 
he considered that Marx was far more influential 
than Freud.
'That Marx is a figure of world
The reputations of both have suffered in recent 
years, and it is doubtful if Fromm's opinion is 
still widely shared.
9 5
,
Fromm's interest in psychology, he tells us, 
began in his early teens, when a young woman whom 
he admired greatly committed suicide immediately 
after the death of her father (who, the young 
Fromm considered, was an unattractive old 
curmudgeon). He could not understand her 
reaction, and this incident and the outbreak of 
World War One, which followed shortly afterwards, 
set the direction of his future studies. He was 
obsessed with the question, 'Why?' 'Why do people 
act in ways that are self-destructive or harmful 
to others?' 'Is such behaviour avoidable?'
These were not purely academic questions for 
Fromm - his life was devoted to the search for 
answers, and in spite of the criticism that may, 
justly, be levelled at his writing, the sincerity 
of his search deserves respect, and presents a 
challenge to his critics to provide better 
answers.
i
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1. Freud
While he never allowed himself to be counted 
among the psychoanalytic schools antagonistic to 
Freud, Fromm was extremely critical of Freud's 
disciples largely because, in his view, they 
regarded as heretical any attempt to revise the 
teachings of their founder. This, he considered, 
justified both his opinion that they were guilty 
of idolatry, and his scathing assessment of the 
authoritarian character of the Freudian School in 
toto; though, as has been seen, the constitution 
of the Institut, of which he was himself a 
prominent member, was authoritarian in the 
extreme.
'Freud was a bold and radical thinker 
in his discoveries, but in their 
application he was impeded by the 
unquestioning belief that his 
society....was the ultimate form of 
human progress and could not be 
improved....the question was, which of 
the two aspects would be developed by 
his disciples? Would they develop 
Freud's special theory of the 1I
unconscious, which was related to 
sexuality, into a general theory that 
would take as its object the whole 
range of repressed psychic 
experiences....
Freud could have been developed in both 
directions. However, his orthodox 
disciples followed the reformer, not 
the radical.,..they were still trading 
on the aura of radicalism that 
psychoanalysis had before the first 
World War, when it was daring and 
revolutionary to expose sexual 
hypocrisy....
Most of those he made leaders of the 
movement were men without any ability 
for radical criticism. Freud himself 
cannot have failed to know this, but he 
chose them because they had one 
unfailing quality: unquestioning
loyalty to him and the movement; in 
fact, many of them possessed 
characteristics of bureaucrats of any 
political movement.' [2]
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When we remember that ’characteristics' was a 
precise term for Fromm, since a large part of his 
life was devoted to the study of human character, 
this passage, which is typical of Fromm's 
attitude to the Freudian School, is particularly 
telling.
Sigmund Freud's Mission includes an 
extended character study of Freud, showing him to 
be authoritarian, paternalistic, résistent to 
criticism and limited by a world view that was 
restricted to the life-style of the nineteenth 
century middle class. Above all, Fromm saw Freud 
as the founder of a movement that became an 
alternative religion.
'Who were these first most loyal 
disciples?..,.They were urban 
intellectuals, with a deep yearning to 
be committed to an ideal, to a leader, 
to a movement, and yet without having 
any religious or political or 
philosophical ideal or convictions; 
there was neither a socialist, Zionist, 
Catholic or Orthodox Jew among 
them....Their religion was the 
movement.' (3)
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If, indeed, Freudianism had become an 
alternative religion, one would hardly have 
expected active members of existing faiths to 
have been attracted to it - allegiance to both 
would have been impossible.
Differences between Fromm and Freud are 
explored in The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness 
(1973) and The Greatness and Limitation of 
Freud's Thought. As the latter book was written 
in the year of Fromm's death, it can be assumed 
to be his final word on the subject and worthy of 
further examination.
What Jay meant by Fromm's 'reliosity' is 
evident in the first paragraph.
'In order to appreciate fully the 
extraordinary significance of Freud's 
psychoanalytic discoveries, one must 
start out with understanding the 
principle on which they are based, and 
one cannot express this principle more 
adequately than through the sentence of 
the Gospels 'And the truth shall make 
you free' (John 8:32). Indeed, the
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idea that truth saves and heals is an
gold insight which the great Masters of 
Living have proclaimed, nobody perhaps I?with such radicalism and clarity as the
ÎBuddha, yet it is a thought common to 
Judaism and Christianity, to Socrates, 
Spinoza, Hegel and Marx. [4]
In general, he praises Freud's observations but 
disagrees with the interpretation; Freud's 
discoveries were creative and liberating but they
were, necessarily, expressed in terms acceptable 'Sg
to his own contemporaries: I' the thinker has to express his new 
thought in the spirit of his time.
Different societies have different 
kinds of 'common sense', different 
categories of thinking, different 
systems of logic; every society has its
I
own 'social filter' through which only 1
certain ideas and concepts and
experiences can pass; those that need
Inot necessarily remain unconscious can t
become conscious when by fundamental
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changes in the social structure the
'the new thought. ... is a blend of what
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'social filter' changes accordingly'.
[,] *
'S
This gives support to the idea of the link 
between individual and social character and 
society which, as we shall see, is a crucial step 
in Fromm's argument - but surely Freud's
'Ifemphasis on infantile sexuality went entirely
'iagainst the grain of society when it was first t
mooted, however fashionable these ideas became -If
later. What were the 'fundamental changes' in if
gthe social structure between the eighteen 
eighties, when Freud's ideas were first mooted, '
and the outbreak of the first World War, by which 
time they were, if still not popular, at least 
part of the common knowledge of educated people?
Fromm explains that it is only with 
hindsight that we can distinguish the new from 
the conventional,
is truly new and the conventional 
thought which it transcends. The 
thinker, however, is not conscious of 
this contradiction... Only in the 
historical process, when social changes 
are reflected in thought patterns, does 
it become evident what in the thought 
of the creative thinker was truly new 
and to what extent his thinking is only 
a reflection of conventional thinking'.
[6]
This leads us to the crux of Fromm's 
critique of Freud's followers and an
understanding of how he saw his own position.
'it is up to his followers living in a 
different frame of ideas to interpret 
the 'master' by distinguishing his 
original thoughts from his conventional 
thoughts, and by analysing the 
contradictions between the new and the
old, rather than by trying to harmonise
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the immanent contradictions of his 
system by all kinds of subterfuge'. 
[7]
t
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Thus we arrive at truth by a rolling process 
in which each generation, with the benefit of 
hindsight, traces the strengths and errors of 
their predecessors. Fromm is doing this for 
Freud, but, in all fairness, it must be said '#that he fully expects that the next generation 
will do as much for him.
'The revision is not simply true as the 
original was not simply false.' [8]
V
His complaint against Freud's disciples was that
they did not do this - Freud's word became
'
sacrosanct and thus progress would have come to 
a halt had it not been for independently minded 
analysts outwith the Freudian school. However, 
it should be noted that in what was an irrascible 
and ongoing quarrel with Freud's admirers, Fromm 
does not lose sight of the religious base to his 
own thought :
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'Man can grasp truth only when he can 
regulate his social life in a human, 
rational, way. To use a politico- 
religious expression, only in the
Messianic Time can the truth be 
recognised insofar as it is
recognisable.' [9]
a
Meanwhile he would not allow himself to be 
counted as a member of any psychoanalytic school
V'antagonistic to Freud, nor did he found a school 
of his own.
' I
:
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2.Specifle Differences between Fromm and Freud.
a . The Oedipus Complex.
Freud had realised that sexuality was a 
function that linked the physical with the 
psychical; this was a considerable step forward, 
but he had over-rated the importance of sexuality 
- later information about the hormonal system 
would provide other connections,
In the absence of this later information, 
Freud's greatest discovery, of the strength of 
unconscious forces of behaviour, was limited to 
an investigation of sexual repression. Because 
of this, Fromm believes that Freud totally 
misunderstood the Oedipus myth - in Fromm's view, 
the whole story, which includes Oedipus at 
Colonnus and Antigone as well as Oedipus Rex, is 
more accurately interpreted in terms of maternal 
versus paternal values, rather than in terms of 
sexual rivalry between father and son.
i:;
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'If we look at the trilogy as a whole, 
we discover that Sophocles is speaking 
of the conflict between the patriarchal 
and the earlier matriarchal world.'
[10]
It is clear that this is of considerable 
importance to Fromm, as he devotes a whole 
chapter in The Forgotten Language as well as a 
long section in The Greatness and Limitation of 
Freud's Thought to a detailed exposition of his 
argument, and references to this myth abound in 
his work.
b . Transference.
Fromm readily acknowledges that Freud had 
broken valuable new ground in his investigation 
into the existence of transference between the 
analysand and the analyst; but in his view, this 
was another Freudian discovery that had not been 
taken far enough, simply because Freud’s 
understanding led him to interpret it simply in 
terms of the persistence of infantile tendencies 
into adulthood.
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'Freud, in discovering transference in 
the psychoanalytic situation made
neurotic patients who are in need of treatment, 
but under certain social conditions the problem 
is generalised.
S i
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another universally valid discovery, 
but on the basis of his premises could :not appreciate the far reaching social 
importance of what he had discovered.'
[11]
Fromm saw that in many respects adults were 
as helpless in the face of circumstances as 
children, and are, therefore, as likely to look 
for a parent substitute to resolve their 
difficulties - this is the case, not only with
3
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' .he remains helpless in his fight
against natural dangers, in the fight
against better armed and and more
powerful social classes and nations,
the fight against disease, and finally 
death. He has better means of defence 
but is also much more aware of the
108
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dangers than a child is. It follows t
that the alleged contrast between the 
helpless child and the powerful adult 
is, to a large extent, fictitious.'
[12]
This becomes a social problem when the 
masses of the people seek a powerful and 
charismatic figure to help them. Fromm instances 
Hitler and De Gaulle.
'Anybody who is willing to see can
.3discover the tremendous role that 
transference plays, socially,
politically and in religious life. One
has only to look at the faces in a 
crowd that applauds a charismatic 
leader like Hitler or De Gaulle, and 
one sees the same expression of blind 
awe, adoration, affection...' [13]
Ï
Such dangerous situations do not arise where
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individuals are encouraged to face up to reality 
and to take an active part in decision making.
*A society whose members are helpless 
needs idols . This can only be overcome 
to the extent to which man is fully 
aware of reality and of his own 
forces.' [14]
In Fromm's view, even in America, this is far 
from being the normal state of affairs :
'Our whole social system rests upon 
this extraordinary effect of people who 
have appeal...the transference in the 
analytic situation and the worship of 
leaders are not different....What is 
often overlooked, is that the adult is 
helpless too.' [15]
c . Narcissism
110
Fromm is extremely critical of Freud's 
attitude to love. He considered that in Freud's
view to be loved is the aim of the normal male; 
actually to love is weakening. Love is a weak 
virtue appropriate to women, whose role is to 
support the male.
Because of this, Freud was incapable of 
appreciating that narcissism is the opposite to
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love. For Freud narcissism was sexual energy 
turned to oneself rather than to the other. 
Fromm believed that Freud's obsession with the
f
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libido put him on the wrong track. In the first 
place, a limited amount of narcissism is 
necessary for survival, and this creates a 
tension with ethico-religious principles which 
require love of one's neighbour, so that
narcissism must be reduced to a minimum. This 
tension is present in the normal as well as the 
neurotic individual. It is a matter of degree, 
or, alternatively, of where one is placed on a 
continuum between narcissism and love.
Fromm describes the narcissistic individual as 
follows :
;
i
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'To narcissistic persons the only 
sector that seems fully real is their 
own person. Feeling, thoughts,
ambition, wishes, body, family, 
everything that they are or what is 
theirs. What they think is true 
because they think it, and even their 
bad qualities are beautiful because 
they are theirs.' [16]
He explains that such qualities can be a 
positive advantage in some professions, such as 
the stage or politics, because they give the 
holder a tremendous confidence in himself that 
creates an aura which may be admired by more 
realistic individuals who question their own 
strengths. This is particularly the case when 
the individual possesses undoubted creative 
talent, since the ability to express one's 
subjectivity is a strength in many of the arts.
The dangers that Fromm sees are failure to love 
and lack of reason. Reason is defined as 'the 
faculty to recognise things as they are 
regardless of their value or danger to u s ' [17]
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'But, one might object, how can we be
113
This, by definition, narcissistic 
individuals cannot do, but if they are possessed 
of strong manipulative intelligence, as is often 
the case with narcissistic politicians, they 
become potentially very dangerous - the more so 
if the mass of the population have not been 
encouraged to think for themselves.
[Fromm, obviously has in mind the situation in 
Weimar Germany - in 1980 he was still preaching
I
the same message.]
The ordinary man, however, is not likely to 
be encouraged to develop a narcissistic outlook - 
but he is in danger of falling prey to group 
narcissism in the form of nationalism, racism or 
any other form of group identification which 
encourages the view that 'my' group is superior
.3] it.i
to the others. '31
sure that his evaluation of his group 
is not realistically correct? For one 
thing, a group can hardly be as perfect 
as its members describe it; the more 
important reason, though, is that
a
criticism of the group is responded to 
with intense rage, which is the 
reaction of one whose individual 
narcissism is wounded. In the
narcissistic character of national, 
political, and religious group reaction 
lies the root of all fanaticism....In 
the cases of hot or cold wars, the 
narcissism takes on a more drastic 
form. My own nation is perfect, peace- 
loving, cultured etcetera; the enemy's 
is the contrary - vile, treacherous, 
cruel..In reality most nations are 
equal in the balance of good and evil
traits; however, virtues and vices are
specific to each nation. What
narcissistic nationalism does is to see
only the virtues of one's own and the
vices of the enemy's nation.' [18]
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recognisable and valid - Edward Said made similar 
points in his recent (1993) Reith Lectures, but
j
■■There is so much in this that is
i
one would like some experimental evidence that 
specific vices and virtues can be attributed to 
individual nations.
Fromm considers that the only remedy for 
this state of affairs is that the lives of 
individuals ’must be (made) so interesting that 
they can relate to others with interest and love' 
[20] and this depends on a 'social structure that 
engenders being and sharing and discourages 
having and possessing.'
This is a reference back to an earlier work, To 
Have or To Be , based on an untenable premise that 
a clear distinction can be made between the two 
terms. - this book will be discussed later.
Group narcissism is encouraged by the 
structure of contemporary cybernetic society. An 
economic system that is based on 'ruthless 
selfishness' necessarily brings about a situation 
in which individuals are isolated and 
antagonistic and, consequently, increasingly 
insecure, and in need of the comfort that comes
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from an exclusive group. This is not to argue 
that group narcissism is to be found only in 
modern society, but that the worship of 
industrial production is, in itself, a deviation 
from the natural order of things and an 
encouragement to narcissism.
'The scientist making these discoveries 
had to perceive things as they are, 
objectively and with little narcissism.
But the consumer...has not had to have 
the mind of the scientist. The 
overwhelming part of the human race has 
not had to devise new technics; they 
have been able to build it. . .and admire 
it. Thus it happens that modern man 
has developed an extraordinary pride in 
his creation; he has deemed himself to 
be a god, he has felt his greatness in 
the contemplation of the grandeur of 
the man-made new earth. Thus admiring 
his second creation, he has admired 
himself in it. [20]
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*Carried to this extreme narcissism makes an idol 
of man himself.
d . Character.
As both Freud and Fromm understand it,
temperament refers only to the instinctive mode 
of reaction to a situation and is independent of, 
and much less important than, character, which is 
the product of experience and which is changeable 
in the light of new insights and experiences.
Character and behaviour are not synonymous; 
character is the force that drives human 
behaviour - for example, a person may save money 
because she is essentially parsimonious or 
because she is saving to make a generous donation 
to a good cause. The behaviour is the same, the 
motivation is totally different. A single person 
will possess many character traits, some of them 
conflicting - but his/her personality, which 
amounts to the total characterisation, is the sum 
of the whole.
'So far Fromm is in agreement with Freud.
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However, he differs fundamentally from Freud 
(who thought that characterisation depended on 
the organisation of the libido) in arguing that
■34character is formed through assimilation and 
socialisation. A person may assimilate or j
acquire things, (or attitudes?), by taking them 
from some outside source or by his own efforts.
To do this he must associate with others, as he 
cannot develop productive attitudes towards 
humanity in the absence of actual people.
(This is not to deny the individual's need for 
solitude, which Fromm himself insists is 
essential - but simply to state a biological 
fact. In order to perpetuate the race people 
must mate and make provision for the upbringing
of their children - who would not otherwise
survive. Moreover humanity's advance to the 
present situation has largely been dependent upon 
the ability to co-operate and share discoveries.)
It would appear, therefore that Fromm 
disagreed with Freud, not on the existence of 
unconscious motivation, but on its 
interpretation. Unlike Freud's disciples he did 
not regard the original (or any) findings as
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being conclusive but as being the start of an 
ongoing process of discovery. It was symptomatic 
of his attitude that he departed from the 
traditional use of the psychiatrist's couch in 
favour of a face-to-face encounter with the 
patient.
3. Marx
While Fromm is critical of Freud's 
authoritarianism, he seems at times to be almost 
deliberately blind to the same vice in Marxism. 
Fromm insists that Marx's message has been 
distorted in the East and misrepresented or 
misunderstood in the West. Nevertheless,
because, in his view, Marx was able to combine 
the best of the spiritual heritage of the 
Enlightenment and German Idealism with socio­
economic reality, Fromm considered that he was a 
towering figure in the potential renaissance of 
Western Humanism.
Important to Fromm's assessment of Marx were the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts written by 
Marx in 1844 but relatively unknown in the West
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until T.B. Bottomore's translation was published 
as a postscript to Fromm's own work, Marx's 
Concept of Man in 1961. In the latter text he 
seeks to correct a widespread misunderstanding of 
Marx based on a common idea of Marx's 
'materialism'.
'Marx's criticism of religion was held 
to be identical with the denial of all 
spiritual values, and this seemed all 
the more apparent to those who assume 
that belief in God is the condition for 
a spiritual orientation.' [21]
Fromm's own departure from theistic belief 
would place him in sympathy with Marx on this 
point, and he continues:
'....this view of Marx then goes on to 
discuss his socialist paradise as one 
of millions of people who submit to an 
all-powerful state bureaucracy....and 
have been successfully transformed
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into millions of uniformed 
robots.... led by a small elite.... 
Suffice it to say at the outset that 
this popular picture of Marx's 
'materialism' is utterly false.' [22]
It is in the remainder of this quotation that we 
begin to see Marx, the prophet, emerging:
'Marx's aim was that of the spiritual 
emancipation of man, of his liberation 
from the chains of economic 
determinism, of restituting him in his 
human wholeness, of enabling him to 
find unity and harmony with his fellow 
man and with nature. Marx's philosophy 
was.,..a new and radical step forward 
in the tradition of prophetic 
Messianism; it aimed at the full 
realisation of individualism, the very 
aim which guided Western thinking from 
the Renaissance and the Reformation far 
into the nineteeth century.' [23]
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However recognisable this is as a view of Marxist 
thought (and many would agree that it was the aim 
if not the outcome) - it certainly is a 
succinct account of the aims of Fromm's own 
philosophy. However, it is difficult for anyone 
who remembers the worst excesses of Stalinism, 
committed in the name of Marx, albeit unjustly, 
not to be wary of new prophets of socialism. 
Fromm has to convince us that the processes that 
brought about this distortion are now 
sufficiently understood to prevent a repetition. 
This, of course, is what he was seeking to do, 
though nothing in his writing suggests that he 
believed that man was likely to change 
sufficiently for the realisation of the ideal to 
be remotely possible.
Nevertheless, it is at least arguable that 
Fromm found in Marx what he was looking for - a 
secular argument for those ethical aspects of his 
religious belief that he could not, in good 
conscience, discard. There is a chapter in The
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Crisis of Psychoanalysis [24] entitled Marx's 
contribution to the Knowledge of Man which is of 
special interest for the comparison between Fromm 
and Marx. One is tempted to say that in Marx we 
find the roots of Fromm's thinking - until it 
becomes apparent that Fromm has had to search 
through Marx's early writings, as well as the 
better known volumes, to find the material to 
make his case and to support his ideas.
'Marx never put his psychological views 
in any systematic form, but they are 
distributed all over his work and have 
to be pulled together to display their 
systematic nature.'[25]
It is clear that Fromm's socialism is 
derived from Marx, but the whole body of his 
thought has to be understood as a creative 
conflation of many sources, among whom Marx and 
Freud were of particular importance.
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4. Freud and Marx : Similarities and Differences 
a) Unconcious forces.
As Fromm saw it, Marx and Freud held many 
views in common, though the rationale in each 
case differed. Both doubted human rationality 
but, whereas Marx saw human thinking as being 
conditioned by the ideology of the society in 
which he lived, Freud laid this irrationality at 
the door of unconscious forces in the individual.
'Marx, like Freud, believed that man's 
consciousness is mostly 'false 
consciousness'. Man believes that his 
thoughts are authentic and the product 
of his thinking while they are in 
reality determined by the objective 
forces at work behind his back; in 
Freud's theory these objective forces 
represent physiological and biological 
needs - in Marx's theory they 
represent social and economic forces 
which determine the being and thus 
indirectly the consciousness of the 
individual.' [26]
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However, both aimed to free individuals from 
their misconceptions and lay bare the truth - 
Marx by a process of education and Freud through 
individual psychoanalysis. Both share the 
humanistic view that each man or woman represents |f
the whole of humanity, which Fromm had arrived at 
through his study of the scriptures, and both see i||
a psychic pathology in the society of their time.
Thus Fromm sees their views as not being /
contradictory - all these forces may be at work 
without human behaviour being entirely determined 
- much depends on the influence of character and 
the degree of awareness in the individual. This :f
will be discussed in more detail in the following 
chapter.
8
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b . 'The Sick Society’.
Fromm elaborates this idea in The Sane 
Society, 1956'
'In the last one hundred years we, in 
the Western World, have created a 
greater material wealth than any other 
society in the history of the human 
race. Yet we have managed to kill off 
millions of our populations in an 
arrangement we call 'war'....
Our direction of economic affairs is 
scarcely more encouraging. We live in 
an economic system in which a 
particularly good crop is often an 
economic disaster....
We have a literacy above 90 per cent of 
the population. We have radio, movies, 
a newspaper a day for everybody. But 
instead of giving the best of past and 
present literature and music, these
media of communication.... fill the
minds of men with the cheapest 
trash....
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raised as to his sanity; should he, 
however, claim that nothing is wrong, 
and that he is acting perfectly 
reasonably, then the diagnosis would 
not even be doubtful any more.' [27]
I
,
Why should I continue with a picture 
that is well-known to everybody?
Certainly, if an individual acted in 
this fashion, serious doubts would be
I
i
what Fromm does not make clear, however, is 
how this state of affairs can be remedied without
using authoritarian means. For Fromm, capitalism 
was simply, and self-evidently, insane, and, like 
the prophets before him, he devoted his life to 
propounding the message to those who did not want 
to hear. (The argument that he had become a 
prophet of Marx has been delayed until the 
conclusion of this thesis.)
However, he was not alone in his view that
society had become sick - it was a view shared by 
both his great mentors. Freud understood 
mankind's sickness in individual terms as being 
a failure to develop a mature genital
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orientation, for which the individual's 
upbringing in the family was to blame. Thus, 
unlike Marx and Fromm, he saw no need for social 
change.
The concept of the sick society is important 
in Fromm's thought but, as Schaar points out, he 
does not explain precisely how one can diagnose 
the degree of sickness in any specific society. 
However, it is implicit in his work that this 
would be done by looking, first, at a cross- 
section of the individuals who comprise that 
society, and then at the family as the 
determinant of the social character. The cure is 
dependent upon the sufferer becoming aware of his 
situation and then taking steps to change those 
factors which are the cause of the suffering. 
Schaar points out a crucial difference between 
Freud and Fromm that is relevant here :
f
'For Fromm, cure is complete only when 
the sufferer has altered the realistic 
situation which has produced the |
sickness. And, since Fromm stresses
the relevance of current (as opposed to
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early childhood) situations in the 
production of neurosis, it follows that 
current realities are the ones which 
must be changed. This is an
emphatically political conception, one 
that calls for large changes in the 
social order. In his conception of a 
cure, Fromm sheds the mantle of a 
doctor of the soul and takes up the 
sword of the reformer.' [28]
It will be argued in the following chapter 
that in taking on the mantle of the social 
critic, he adopts the role of the prophet.
However, Schaar identifies two immediate 
difficulties with this; firstly, that Fromm's 
description of the healthy society is altogether 
too loose and general, and, secondly, that no 
society ever existed that would qualify as 
'healthy' in Fromm's terms, and that one can only 
assume that 'the good society is the good man 
writ large'. [29]
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Fromm did not expect to see the perfectly healthy 
society before the messianic time, but 
would still insist that we should co-operate to 
work towards that desirable end.
c Alienation.
Marx, on the other hand, saw mankind's 
handicap in terms of 'alienation', a concept that 
Fromm had used to describe the separation of the 
idea of God from the actual experience. 
However, in Marx, it is man who has become 
alienated from the product of his own work 
through increasing mechanisation, and hence from 
himself and from fulfilling relationships with 
others. Thus because he was concerned,
primarily, with historical and socio-economic 
forces, rather than individual psychology, he 
blamed the ills of society on social organisation 
under capitalism and recommended socialism as the 
remedy.
As we have seen, Fromm defined alienation in 
terms of idolatry. He saw alienation as a 
process by which the individual transferred his
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own human powers to someone or some thing else. 
The object to which these powers are transferred 
then becomes an idol to be worshipped by the very 
person to whom the powers truly belong. This 
process seems to be closer to 'transference' as 
understood by Freud, than to Marx's understanding 
of alienation.
Even human beings can become the subject of 
idolatry - Fromm believed that the ideas of both 
Marx and Freud had been turned into ideologies 
and used to defend positions that would have been 
anathema to their originators - and thus, by 
implication, that both men had become mere idols 
to their followers.
In Marx's thought, man, being no longer a 
craftsman who for however brief a time 'owned' 
the object of his labour, in a society based on 
production became alienated from the product of 
his labour. Moreover, because modern industrial 
production requires stratification of society 
into distict classes and competition for 
position, in such a society, inevitably, man 
becomes alienated from his fellows. Fromm's 
understanding of the Marxian position is
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demonstrated in the following quotation from 
Beyond the Chains of Illusion.
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'All these consequences flow from the
fact the the worker is related to the
product of his labour as an alien
object. For it is clear on this
presupposition that the more the worker
expends himself in his work, the more
powerful becomes the world of objects
he creates in face of himself, the
poorer he becomes in his inner life and
the less he belongs to himself; it is
just the same as in religion. The more
of himself man attributes to God the
.less he has left for himself.' [30]
I am not entirely convinced by this extract.
I can believe that a man (or woman) 'gives' 
himself in the making of a piece of 
craftsmanship; but would have considered that he 
would be likely to withhold that degree of 
commitment to a task of routine repetition on a 
production line - and that it is in this sense,
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of withholding commitment, that he would be 
alienated from his work. Nor, initially, was I 
convinced that when we convey to our concept of 
'God' (whatever form that concept takes) the best 
that we know, that we are necessarily depriving 
ourselves of those values. Rather we are 
postulating a being who has those values in 
perfection and in perpetuity and setting Him up 
as a model against which we can measure our own 
intermittent and limited attainment, in the hope 
of improvement. However, it may be that Fromm is 
saying that mankind is projecting human values on 
to a Being who is wholly other, and in so doing 
is denying the possibility that humanity can ever 
attain perfection. By doing this he is denying 
the possibility of the messianic time - and that 
man can ever become like God. This could be 
avoided by postulating the possibility of a 
perfect man as the ideal at which to aim. 
Christians have gone part of the way by 
postulating Christ as the representation of 
perfect humanity, but then they recoil from their 
own audacity and insist that the perfect man must 
also be God.
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Typically, Freud saw alienation in the 
process of 'transference' - which, as we have 
seen, occurs between the patient and the 
psychotherapist when feelings or attitudes
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Nevertheless, the idea that mankind must 
eventually take over from God is gaining ground. 
In the best-selling popular text The Road Less 
Travelled, we find M. Scott Peck, himself a 
psychoanalyst, saying:
'For no matter how we pussyfoot around 
it, all of us who postulate a loving 
God and really think about it, 
eventually come to a single terrifying 
idea: God wants us to become Himself
(or Herself or Itself). We are growing 
toward Godhood. God is the goal of
evolution.'. [31]
applicable to another person (e.g. parents or 
siblings) are displaced on to the analyst.
Fromm comments :
I
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'Needless to add that the transference 
phenomenon is not restricted to the 
analytic situation. It is to be found 
in all forms of idolisation of 
authority figures, in political, 
r e l i g i o u s ,  a n d  s o c i a l  
life....Alienation as a sickness of the 
self can be considered to be the core
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of the psychopathology of modern life g
...,' [32]
I
The process of transference seems to be 
involved in idolisation as Fromm understood it - 
though the words he uses to describe it come
'directly from the passage taken from Marx and 
quoted above.[28] Clearly, these concepts 
overlap - but in Freud's case the term is related 
to the individual patient, whereas Marx and Fromm 
are concerned with the individual in society - 
and therein lies most of the confusion identified 
by Schaar, (see below).
It should be noted, however, that the concept of 
'alienation' in Fromm's thought is linked with
Ï
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was not original to Marx. It was first used by
I
@
his understanding of 'idolatry' and that this
ft.'understanding reaches back to the teaching of the 
prophets and their concept of the messianic time.
It is a continuing theme in Fromm's writing - he
■ .V .
insists that the idolatry of things and the 
consequent devaluation of the individual is the 
greatest evil in contemporary society.
As Schaar points out, the term 'alienation'
Hegel and appropriated by Feuerbach, before being 
taken up by Marx, and thence to Fromm.
*In Marx, Schaar believes.
'Alienation is nothing but capitalism
Iseen from one angle of vision, capitalism seen from the point of view 
of its evil impact on man. Hence when 
Marx wrote the history and analysed the 
dynamics of capitalism, he did the same 
for alienation, because alienation was 
not an incidental feature of
capitalism, but capitalism itself, 
capitalism in its social-psychological
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'man does not experience himself as the 
active bearer of his own powers and
substance.' [34]
aspect. From this it follows that 
alienation follows as capitalism 
advances and disappears as capitalism
,disappears.' [33]
1
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This is clearly oversimplistic, but Schaar 
argues that, superficial though it is, it is a 
view of alienation that is shared both by 
Marxists and those who oppose Marxist ideas. He 
points out that the concept is an essential
part of Marx's theory, and that it has four |f
■ fdifferent aspects which, for his purposes can be
grouped into two broad categories : 'alienated g
labour' and 'alienated human relations'. He sd
considers that Fromm held on to the core of 
Marx's ideas, which Fromm himself formulated as
follows:
1
■|
richness, but as an impoverished
''thing', dependent on powers outside
'himself, unto whom he projected his
..V,'
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undoubtedly true. Moreover Fromm is not
consistent in his use of the term 'alienation',
But he has added psychological content and,
'In this expansion lies Fromm's 
contribution. In it also lies his 
peril, for in his hands alienation 
becomes so protean a term that it loses
some of its precision, and therefore 
the analytic utility, of Marx's
Fromm has moved from a critique of class society 
to an evaluation of mass society and this, 
overall, in Schaar's view, is an advantage. 
However, he points out that very little empirical 
work has been done on the problem of alienation,
which is a 'promising hypothesis' rather than 'a 
verified theory' [36] and Fromm is selective in 
his choice of illustrative material. This is
3'ï;
at times using it in a descriptive sense to 
describe how people feel, and at other times 
using it in an objective diagnostic sense to 
explain unfelt anxiety and discontent, Fromm,
138 I
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similarly, tends to conflate 'technology' with 
'capitalism'.
Surprisingly, however, considering the 
extent of his criticism, Schaar concludes:
'These necessary qualifications and 
criticisms made, there remains much in 
Fromm's diagnosis which is excellent.
Fromm has earned a secure place in the 
splendid tradition of humanistic social 
criticism.' [37]
This point will be important in the final 
consideration of Fromm's claim to be considered 
as a modern prophet.
d . Ideologies and rationalisations.
The concepts of 'ideology' and 
'rationalisation' are used by both Marx and Freud 
and both are given a subtle reinterpretation by 
Fromm to suit his own purposes.
i
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'Ideology' commonly tends to be used as a 
perjorative term for a set of ideas divorced from 
reality. According to Raymond Williams, Marx and 
Engels saw ideologies as
'nothing more than the ideal expresion 
of the d o m i n a n t  m a t e r i a l  
relationships...' [38]
Fromm uses the concept differently again. 
As he sees it, ideas that were originally valid 
come to be separated from their original context, 
lose their original force and may indeed be used 
to convey meanings quite contrary to those 
intended at the outset. He believes that 
Christianity provides the perfect example.
'Take the example of Christian 
teaching: the ideals of brotherly love, 
justice, charity, etc., were once 
genuine ideals....but throughout 
history these ideals have been misused 
to produce rationalisations for 
purposes which were the very opposite.
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Independent and rebellious spirits have 
been killed, peasants have been 
exploited and oppressed, wars have been 
blessed, hatred of the enemy has been 
encouraged in the name of these very 
ideals.' [39]
Thus a set of ideas becomes an ideology when 
the words in which the ideals were originally 
encapsulated are used in a different context to 
convey quite different meanings. As we have 
seen, in Fromm's view the ideas of both Marx and 
Freud have been turned into ideologies, in this 
sense, by their followers. However, while an 
ideology can work in this way as rationalisation, 
it nevertheless still carries the seed of the 
original ideal which, given the right conditions, 
may be reactivated and again become a potent 
force.
'Rationalisation', in itself, serves no useful 
purpose, as it invariably serves to disguise the 
real motivation guiding a particular course of 
action. If an explanation can be shown to be
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pure rationalisation it is totally invalidated - 
but in the case of an ideology something might 
possibly be saved:
'The task of critique is not to 
denounce the ideals, but to show their 
transformation into ideologies, and to 
challenge the ideology in the name of 
the betrayed ideal.' [40]
This is the task that Fromm has assumed in 
his assessment of the contribution of Marx and 
Freud; an assessment which is outlined in Beyond 
the Chains of Illusion, but which, in effect, 
constituted the work of his lifetime.
e . Repression.
Fromm believes that a person's unconscious 
contains all the good and evil of which he is 
capable. Which comes to the surface and which is 
repressed depends partly on his own level of 
development and partly on the level of the 
society to which he belongs. Thus both the
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individual and society are involved in the 
process. Repression of unpalatable facts is 
found in both capitalist and communist societies 
and in Fromm's view its root is to be found in
Ï
the universal fear of isolation and ostracism.
People simply will not 'see' the truths that 
underlie their particular form of society, if 
that 'seeing' forces them to go against the grain 
of their own group or community. Only those who -have achieved freedom through the full 
development of the self have the strength to 
stand up and be counted in these circumstances.
Said is referring to the same mechanism in 
his sixth Reith Lecture when he describes the 
situation where:
'It is rather when a totally dogmatic 
system - in which one side is 
innocently good, the other irreducably 
evil - is substituted for the process, 
the give and take of vital interchange, 
that ....politics becomes religious 
enthusiasm - as is the case in former
Yugoslavia - with results in ethnic 
cleansing, mass slaughter and unending
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conflict that are horrible to 
contemplate.' [41]
To Marx, the repression that really matters 
is social repression (seen as representing social 
backwardness), so that with increasing 
civilisation comes a commensurate reduction in 
repression.
'For Marx....repression is essentially 
the result of the contradictions 
between the need for the full 
development of man and the given social 
structure - hence the fully developed 
society in which exploitation and 
class conflict have disappeared does 
not need ideologies and can dispense 
with repression.' [42]
Presumably, in the fully developed society 
individuals will continue to create original 
ideas which never degenerate into ideologies. 
Moreover they will have developed strategies for 
dealing with any potentially conflicting ideas.
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Paradise indeed! Nevertheless, the idea of such 
a society is not inconsistent with Fromm’s idea 
of the messianic time.
Freud, on the other hand, laid the 
stress on the repression of the individual sexual 
drive within the family structure and, 
consequently he believed that civilisation led to 
an increase in repression.
'Freud was mainly concerned with the 
uncovering of the individual 
unconscious. While he assumed that 
society enforced repressions these were 
the repressions of instinctual forces, 
and not the social repressions that 
really matter...’[43]
It is hard to see how the practical 
application of Freud's thought could lead to more 
than a manageable and comfortable balance between 
between instinctive forces and rationality. The 
idea that the purpose of psychoanalysis is to act 
as the means of helping people to adapt to 
existing conditions was anathema to Fromm, and
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was the source of much of his criticism of 
contemporary psycho-analytic practice. (See The 
Crisis of Psychoanalysis (1971). However, it is 
not difficult to see how Freud's followers came 
to move in this direction, as Freud was concerned 
purely with the sickness of the individual - 
whereas Fromm believed that the individual could 
not be made whole apart from the society in which 
he lived.
[Fromm's pre-psychoanalytic training in 
sociology, - as opposed to Freud's medical 
background may have much to do with this.]
In any event, Fromm's position was much 
closer to that of Marx, though while Freud saw 
the process in terms of repression of inherent 
tendencies in the individual and Marx was 
concerned entirely with social pressures - Fromm 
considered both individual and social pressures 
were involved and developed his idea of the 
'social character' as the essential link between
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the two.
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5. Fromm's synthesis of Freud and Marx,
a . The social character.
Fromm considered that Marx was unable to 
explain exactly how the economic basis of society 
was translated into its ideological 
superstructures and that this difficulty could be
overcome by the introduction of the concepts of 
the social character and the social unconscious. 
[Individual character, according to Fromm (and he 
differs here from Freud) will fall into one of 
five broad categories: the receptive; the
exploitative; the hoarding; the marketing; and,
finally, the productive character. These
',%:scategories are to some extent self-explanatory, 
but will be dealt with more fully in the 
following chapter.]
Character is dynamic and provides the 
motivation for behaviour - since motivation 
depends on how a person thinks or feels - and 
this, in turn, depends upon his character. 
Social character is most simply described as the 
character that is most typical of a given 
society, but it is seen by Fromm as the link
between the economic basis and the ideas and 
ideals of society.
As the behaviour of individuals is 
ultimately dependant upon their character, so is 
the behaviour of a particular society driven by 
the character orientation of the majority of its 
citizens.
Clearly, individual character and social 
character are closely linked, but the social 
character is not just the sum or average of the 
individual characters forming a given community. 
It is the character that is most typical of the 
community; and is brought about by factors that 
influence all the members of the community alike. 
Fromm defines it as:
'The essential nucleus of the character 
structure of most members of a group 
which has developed as the result of 
the basic experiences and mode of life 
common to the group.' [44]
Part of his assessment of the workers in
148
Il,
Weimar Germany was that the great majority had an 
authoritarian character structure and, therefore, 
a deep seated respect and longing for 
established authority, so that they were ready to 
support a regime that seemed to promise just 
that. I'Iv'.Any given society functions economically ■I:in ways that are determined by external 
conditions: climate, population, geographical
position - and by the stage of development it has 
reached, in terms of the means of production and 
political organisation. If things are to 
continue to run smoothly the individual members 
of society must want to conform to the norms of 
that society. Overt compulsion invites
revolution. It is the purpose, therefore, of the 
social character to perform the function of ■Iconditioning individual members so that they
'i
direct their energies in such a way as to ensure 
the continuity of that society. However, against
:the forces conditioning man to conform, are
'inherent human qualities leading him to assert 
his basic freedom.
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' In trying to avoid the errors of 
biological and metaphysical concepts we 
must not succumb to an equally grave 
error, that of a sociological 
relativism in which man is nothing but 
a puppet, directed by the strings of 
social circumstances. Man's
inalienable rights of freedom and 
happiness are founded in inherent human 
qualities; his striving to live, to 
expand and to express the 
potentialities that have developed in 
him in the process of historical 
revolution.' [45]
The point here is that the concept of the social 
character provides Fromm with the link he seeks 
between Marx and Freud.
iÎ
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'Freudians saw the individual 
unconscious and were blind to the 
social unconscious; orthodox Marxists, 
on the contrary, were keenly aware of 
unconscious factors in social
150
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'The social character results from the
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behaviour, but remarkably blind in 
their appreciation of individual
motivation. This led to a
deterioration of Marxist theory and 
practice, just as the reverse
phenomenon has led to the deterioration 
of psychoanalytic theory and therapy. 
This result should not surprise 
anybody. Whether one studies society 
or individuals one always deals with
human beings, and that means that one 
deals with their unconscious 
motivations ; one cannot separate man as 
an individual from man as a social 
participant - and if one does one ends 
up by understanding neither. [46]
In Escape from Freedom. Fromm demonstrates 
the link between social character and ideology 
and in so doing shows how economic conditions 
crucially affect the whole structure.
He sums up the process as follows:
stabilize and intensify the new social
to social conditions but a dynamic 
adaptation on the basis of elements 
that are either biologically inherent 
in human nature or have become inherent 
as the result of historic evolution.
[47]
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dynamic adaptation of human nature to 
the structure of society. Changing 
social conditions bring about changes 
in the social character, that is, in 
new needs and anxieties. These new 
needs give rise to new ideas and, as it 
were, make men susceptible to them;
these new ideas in their turn tend to
character and to determine man's
actions. In other words, social
conditions influence ideological 
phenomena through the medium of
character; character on the other hand,
is not the result of passive adaptation
I1II
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This can be laid out in diagrammatic form
Behaviour results from
Social character
Economic conditions Ideologies
culture
and
y/Individual character 
Inherent characteristics
Thus economic conditions affect both the 
individual character and the social character and 
these, in turn, give rise to the ideologies that 
support and maintain the existing economic 
conditions.
Just as the individual may be unaware of the 
repressed factors that govern his behaviour - so 
society as a whole may be, and usually is,
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unaware of the factors underlying the direction
taken by that society. Thus it is, for example, 
that a nation can rush headlong into a war that 
very few individuals actually want. Their 
society is being driven by forces of which they 
are not consciously aware, and over which, 
therefore, they have no conscious control. (Some
of these forces are discussed in more detail in
■the next chapter.)
f
'To a later generation, years after the 
outbreak of mass insanity, the insane 
character of such thinking, even though
it was shared by almost everybody, may 
be clear; thus some of the more extreme 
reactions to the Black Death in the
Middle Ages, the witch hunting at the 
time of the Counter Reformation, the 
religious hatred in England in the
seventeenth century, the hatred against 
the Huns in the first World War, appear 
to be pathological manifestations many 
years later. But usually there is 
little awareness of much that passes
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Hence Fromm's thesis that it is absolutely 
necessary for each individual to develop his
""Is
3for 'thinking' while it is occurring.'
[48]
powers to the point where he is able to control 
his life, and to recognise the truth in any given
Ïsituation, regardless of the distortions of 
propaganda - so that society as a whole may act 
rationally and not remain within the grip of
irrational forces.
Said gives examples of these same irrational 
forces in his second Reith Lecture. Here he is ||
referring to the way in which Islam is in danger 
of taking the place of communism as the 'bogey­
man' of the West. ;;|
i
'here corporate thinking has not made 
intellectuals into the questioning and 
sceptical individual minds about which 
I have been speaking, but rather into
,a chorus that echoes the prevailing 
policy view, hastening it along into :i£
more corporate thinking, and gradually
15 5 i■ 3'
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into a more and more irrational sense 
that 'we' are being threatened by 
'them'.[49]
However, here Fromm is faced with an 
apparently insoluble dilemma. Man can develop 
productively only in a society that does not
Yet it appears that no civilised society has 
fulfilled this condition, though some have been 
more conducive to freedom than others.
Nevertheless, Fromm believed that throughout
have been hell-bent on taking a road that is
obstruct this process. In such a society each
■individual could develop his powers to the full.
s
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history, when society as a whole has seemed to
i'
totally destructive, prophets have arisen to give 
warning and to urge a change of direction. This 
perception is clearly taken from the mythic 
narratives of the prophets, rather than from 
careful academic study, but Said looks to his 
'intellectuals' to perform a similar function in 
society:
:
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'The central fact for me is, I think, 
that the intellectual is an individual 
endowed with a faculty for 
representing, embodying, articulating 
a message, a view, an attitude, 
philosophy or opinion to, as well as 
for, the public, in public ....[50]
This, I have already argued was crucial to the
prophet's role.
'And this role has an edge to it, and 
cannot be played without a sense of 
being someone whose place it is to 
raise embarrassing questions, to 
confront orthodoxy and dogma (rather 
than to produce them) to be someone who
cannot easily be co-opted by 
governments and corporations, and whose 
raison d 'etre is to represent all these 
people and issues that are routinely
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forgotten or swept under the rug. ' [511
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These are the people who should be there 'to 
give warning and urge a change of direction'.
If a sufficient proportion of the people 
take heed, and the prevailing ideology and 
economic conditions are sufficiently modified, 
disaster is avoided - for the time being. 
Unfortunately, because to create real change all 
four elements (i.e. the economy, social and 
individual character and ideology) must be 
altered simultaneously, there is small likelihood 
of this happening. Nevertheless, in spite of the 
slim chance of a successful outcome, Fromm, I am 
convinced, saw himself as being called to the 
prophetic role (or to that of Said's 
intellectual?) since, in his view, the only 
chance of a future for civilisation as we know it 
depended upon a change from the 'having' mode of 
contemporary society, to the 'being' mode that 
could potentially lead to the messianic time.
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«b ) Having and being.
In To Have or To B e . Fromm tells us; I
’ . ...having and being are two 
fundamental modes of experience, the
3respective strengths of which determine
the differences between the characters
social character.' [52]
him. However, typically, he goes further than
this and destroys his own argument with 
unnecessary abstractions.
In Fromm's view, having is an alienated form 
of existence in which the individual assesses his 
own and others ' value in terms of the goods 
owned, be these material or abstract (power and
■3:3of individuals and various types of :
If all that Fromm intended by this was that 
it is better to value people for what they are. yi
as opposed to what they own, and that a society 
that puts value on things rather than on people :#ris to be deprecated, many people would agree with
.3: 
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honour are possessions in this sense.)
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This might be acceptable, but when he adds 
that such people are so obsessed with 'having' 
that they speak of 'having a pain' instead of 
'feeling a pain', the argument begins to break 
down. The use of the active rather than the 
passive tense is often colloquial, and we talk of 
'having a cold' but would more naturally speak of 
'being ill' than of 'having an illness'. This 
has nothing to do with character type.
On the other hand, Fromm considers, the 
person who has evolved to the state where he is 
free to be himself and to know himself, 
experiences life at first hand. He may, or may 
not, enjoy certain possessions but he is not 
dependent on them. He is his own man.
Again, there is truth in this. It is good 
to be able to enjoy things without being 
dependent on them, to depend ultimately on an 
inner strength that cannot easily be destroyed 
whatever the circumstances. But to introduce 
arguments about the state of the self requires a 
much stronger philosophical underpinning than 
Fromm provides.
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and he also sees a need for men who are strong 
enough to stand against the tide:
'Nothing in my view is more 
reprehensible than those habits of mind 
in the intellectual that induce 
avoidance, that characteristic turning 
away from a difficult and principled 
position which you know to be the right
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(If he had stuck to homily, he might have been 
more effective.)
Said, also, hopes that his 'intellectuals' 
will work towards a better society:
'..in trying to induce a change in the 
moral climate whereby aggression is 
seen as such, the unjust punishment of 
peoples or individuals is either 
prevented or given up, and the 
recognition of rights and democratic 
freedoms is established as a norm for 
everyone, not invidiously for a select 
few.' [53]
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one, but which you decide not to take. '
[54]
Said, however, not only depends on 
intellectual argument to make his point, he gives 
his 'intellectuals' no other weapon in their
is to be effective.
Schaar thought Fromm was ludicrously 
optimistic about this;
'The revolution must not be merely, or 
even primarily, economic or political
must sweep across all these sections 
simultaneously: a prairie fire of
progress.' [54]
II:;3■3:r
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fight against injustice. Fromm, for all his
unnecessary mystifications, may be on stronger 
ground when he argues that not only ideology, but 1
findividual and social character, as well as the 
economic conditions that contribute to their
■34nature, must be simultaneously changed if change
I
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or moral or philosophical. Rather it
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This is unfair. Fromm was well aware of the
difficulties, nor did he expect to see perfection
:before the messianic time - he saw, or believed 
he saw, the direction mankind must take if 
progress is to be made, and he shared his vision, 
but he had no reason to do more than hope that 
some initial movement will be made in that 
direction.
He likens his situation to that of the 
parent of a very sick child:
'The most adequate words would be, "I 
have faith that my child will live". 
But 'faith', because of its theological 
implications is not a word for today. 
Yet it is the best we have, because 
faith implies an extremely important 
element; my ardent, intense wish for my 
child to live, hence my doing 
everything possible to bring about his 
recovery.' [56]
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What the sources of property are does 
not matter; nor does possession impose 
any obligation on property owners. The
my own; as long as I do not violate the
absolute.' [57]
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c) Capitalism/Socialism.
In To Have or To B e . capitalism is seen as 
being synonymous with the 'having' mode of 
existence and, therefore, no good can come of it:
'Our judgments are extremely biased 
because we live in a society that rests 
on private property, profit, and power 
as the pillars of existence. To 
acquire, to own, and to make a profit 
are sacred and unalienable rights of
'the individual in industrial society.
I
principle is: Where and how my property 
was acquired is nobody's business but
law, my right is unrestricted and
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3:'4
,1
• IfI
I
.III#
%
3
a
That such extreme selfishness would be
wrong, does not mean that there can be no case 
for the right to any private property. (Indeed, 
’right to property’ was included in The
Declaration of Rights of Man published after the
I
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French Revolution, and this would suggest that 
property was held by right rather than 
selfishness.) Rather it is a case of priorities 
- if the most important things in life (our Gods) 
are private property, profit and power, and not 
the welfare of human beings (or some greater 
good such as 'God's will on earth'), then 
something has gone astray. Fromm, as ever, tends 
to overstate his case. However, he does see the 
dangers involved in the Russian version of 
communism, which he saw as nothing less than 
'state-capitalism', which served the Russians 
less well than the Western version.
'At any rate, every socialist or 
communist party that could claim to 
represent Marxian thought would have 
to be based on the conviction that the 
Soviet regimes are not socialist
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systems in any sense, that socialism is 
incompatible with a bureaucratic, 
thing-centred, consumption-orientated 
social system, and that it is
incompatible with the materialism and 
cerebralisation that characterise the 
Soviet, like the capitalist system.'
[58]
In Beyond the Chains of Illusion Fromm
summarizes the ideals and attitudes of those
radical humanists of whom he approves, chief
among them being the Buddha, Eckhart, Marx and 
Schweitzer, upon whose views, he believes, a true 
socialism could be built on the following terms:
'1. That production must serve the real needs of 
the people, not the demands of the economic
system;
2. That a new relation must be established
between people and nature, one of co-operation
not of exploitation;
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33. That mutual antagonism must be replaced by 
solidarity;
4. That the aim of all social arrangements must 
be human well-being and the prevention of ill- 
being;
5. That not maximum consumption but sane 
consumption that furthers well-being must be 
striven for;
6. That the individual must be an active, not a 
passive, participant in social life.' [59]
For Fromm, this rationalist/humanist 
socialism is the ideal, but to reach it men need 
the understanding of humanity provided by 
psychoanalysts and the knowledge of society 
provided by historians and sociologists - we 
need both Freud and Marx. We need also the 
rational faith that is a positive attitude to 
life and which will be discussed more fully in 
the next chapter.
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d) Fromm's 'Credo'.
Concluding Beyond the Chains of Illusion 
Fromm defines his 'Credo*.
He starts with man as the product of 
evolution, with each individual as the 
representative of humanity and with man's essence 
as the product of the dichotomy of his existence.
He sees man's aim as being the achievement 
of maximum human development and thus he believes 
in human perfectibility. However this 
perfectibility is consequent on the making of the 
right choices and Fromm is pessimistic - 
he sees no evidence that man is about to choose 
rightly.
He repeats the importance of the choice 
between life and death, which he derived 
originally from the scriptures and which is 
dicussed in the following chapter, and suggests 
that there are alternative ways of arriving at 
the good :
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1. by obedience to laws (as was expected of 
the Jews traditionally).
2. by developing a sense of well-being in | 
well-doing.
f
[Fromm's 'Credo' was written as a postscript to 
Beyond the Chains of Illusion  ^ in 1962, Having 
and Being was not published until 197 6, though I 
have found it convenient to refer to both in this 
chapter. I think that, here, there is no special :=imeaning in Fromm's choice of words to convey a
'Isense of feeling good because one has been e
behaving well. It is in keeping with the rest of :
his philosophy that he considers the latter icourse is to be preferred,] |
He believes it is possible to educate the 
young to appreciate this feeling of 'well-being'
:through 'the best heritage of the human race', %though he does not state of what the ' best 
heritage' is formed.
Society is necessary for the full 
development of the individual, but if the aim of 
'one world' is to be achieved, fully developed 
individuals will be required.
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Man has an inalienable right to freedom to 
develop and has, in fact, already developed to 
the stage where he could free himself from 
nature, but has succumbed instead to things.
In the light of the foregoing, mankind can 
only be saved by reason and then only if belief 
in the perfectibility of humanity is maintained 
(and, bearing in mind the difference made by
Fromm between 'cleverness' and 'wisdom', the
recognition of truth is a matter of character and
not intelligence.)
Such was Fromm ' s own summing up of his
position at that time. It should perhaps be #
'
noted that the 1962 text was written as part of 
a series, Credo Perspectives and that this may 
have a bearing on the rather strange style of the 
writing in the postscript.
Overall, it must be said that Fromm's :fanalysis of the human condition gains much from 
his ability to see humanity in both sociological |
and psychological terms while at the same time 
retaining a sense of a spiritual dimension. That 
he is not always, (or often) the master of the 
complexity of this tri-partite vision, and
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that his argument often seems confused, should 
not blind us to the value of his aim. A one­
sided view of humanity provides a more 
straightforward argument but only by avoiding the 
reality and richness of life as it is actually 
experienced.
Î
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religious leaders have all, at one time or
CHAPTER 4 “ Fromm's psychology
There has never been a lack of social 
critics - ecologists, economists, journalists, 
politicians, philosophers, sociologists and
another, attempted to diagnose the contemporary 
condition and offer a remedy; though they have 
generally tended to see the world through the 
lens of their own expertise.
Fromm was, by profession, a psycho-analyst,
behave. Nor would we be disappointed; such 
factors occur in all of Fromm's output, but for 
the fullest account of his psychology one would 
turn particularly to texts such as, Man for
Destructiveness, (1973), and, of course, his
critiques of Freud, Sigmund Freud's Mission.
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SO that we would expect to find a strong 
psychological component in his vision - drawing 
attention to the unconscious as well as to the 
conscious forces that determine the way we
I-'
'i.
Himself. (1947); The Art of Loving. (1957); The 
Heart of Man, (1964); and The Anatomy of Human
(1959) and The Greatness and Limitation of 
Freud's thought, (1980).
■
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1. Character
As we have seen in the discussion of Fromm's 
relationship to Freud, both men saw character as 
being of vital importance, because it is capable sof being changed. Character determines
motivation, and motivation determines behaviour.
Personality, on the other hand, is the sum of 
many character traits which vary from individual 
to individual. However, whereas Freud thought
character was determined by the libido in infancy s;aand early childhood; Fromm considered that
character traits were the result of the J
individual's reaction to experience at any age.
,The early experiences within the family were of g
great importance but were not the whole story - 
relationships with other people throughout life 
had a part to play.
However, the relationship with others may be 
one of competition or co-operation, love or hate, 
and be oppressive and authoritarian or based on 
equality and freedom. Each individual has 
arrived at a settled pattern in his way of g
■■Ïdealing with life which allows him to react, more ï
;
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or less automatically, to the myriad of major and
minor problems that life throws at him. It is |
this patterned response that Fromm is referring 
to when he speaks about 'character', and he
believes that such patterning has come to replace 
the instinctive behaviour of animals.
He divides these near-instinctive 
orientations into those which are 'productive'
at least by implication, that it is by developing
178
and those which are 'non-productive', and argues, ; ,
a productive orientation that mankind will reach f
athe messianic goal. i-
Individuals will display a mixture of 
productive and non-productive traits and the aim 
of Fromm's psycho-analysis, and his teaching, is 
to make people more aware of their strengths and 
weaknesses, to the point where they can become 
responsible for their own further development. 
(He dislikes the term 'unconscious' - preferring 
to describe the individual's situation in terms 
of greater or lesser awareness of the factors 
which have been repressed in the individual, or 
which in the social situation are generally not 
recognised.)
I
,
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Broadly speaking, Fromm divides the non- 
productive orientation into four categories :
a) The receptive orientation - where the 
individual expects to obtain all he needs from 
others as a gift - either by earning it for good 
behaviour or by coaxing.
b) The exploitative orientation - typical 
of the individual who expects to obtain what he
1'
•Ineeds from others, by guile or by force.
c) The hoarding orientation - such a person
obtains his feelings of security by holding tight î
to what he has and seeking to increase his 
hoard, by whatever means present themselves.
d) The marketing orientation - marketing :W'man expects to obtain what he needs from others 
by means of barter - his faith is in things and 
people are treated as such.
Fromm relates these character types to the 
social character of particular civilisations or
periods of history. While one can accept that
ithe social character (which as we have seen is
■'ithe character which is most typical of the 
individuals comprising a given society) would
i'3change gradually as the living and working
conditions of the people changed - Fromm gives
17 9
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his argument too hard an edge when he describes 
the hoarding character as being typical of 
nineteenth century capitalism, and marketing man 
as the typical contemporary figure. As with so 
much of Fromm, there is truth in this, but he 
tends to overstate his case. However, since he 
does see the marketing orientation as being 
predominant in contemporary society, it is this 
characteristic that is most frequently under 
attack in his social criticism.
The productive orientation is the one 
towards which society should aim - it is roughly 
equivalent to Freud's 'genital character' but 
goes beyond the concept of sexual maturity to 
that of the individual who is aware of his own 
powers and able to make constructive and creative 
use of them - free from dependence on, or 
submission to, other people. Such a person is 
able to respond to others on equal terms and to 
will their well-being as his own - his power is 
power to r not power over.
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2. Love and Faith
narcissism, is sufficiently important in Fromm's 
thinking to be given a text to itself. The Art 
of Loving defines love as a difficult art that 
has to be learnt. It is the means by which man 
learns, slowly and painfully, to overcome his 
separateness, and an analogy is drawn with the 
love of God. (In whom Fromm does not believe!)
'In conventional Western theology the
■ %:0 
'1
Why use the term 'productive'? Fromm sees 
the productive man as working on himself to 
produce the person he has the potential to 
become. No-one ever completes this process but 
emotional and intellectual capabilities are 
capable of continuous development in the 
direction of productive love, which involves 
care and responsibility, as well as respect for, 
and insightful knowledge of, the person who is |
loved.
----- I
Productive love, as the alternative pole to
I
3 
...
3 3' : ' #
more room - and no need - for knowledge 
about God,' [1]
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attempt is made to know God by thought, 
to make statements about God. It is 
assumed that I can know God by my 
thought. In mysticism ....the attempt 
is given up to know God by thought, and 
it is replaced by the experience of
union with God in which there is no
i
It is this degree of at-one-ment with the other 
that is the aim of love, and which Fromm 
eventually concludes is the product of the mature 
productive character. He, therefore, sees 
contemporary civilisation as antithetical to
love, insofar as it hinders the growth of the 
productive character.
What is essential, is faith:
'In the sphere of human relations, 
faith is an indispensable quality of 
any significant friendship or love. 
'Having faith' in another person means 
to be certain of the reliability and
■ 0
unchangeability of his fundamental 
attitudes, of the core of his 
personality, of his love....
In the same sense we have faith in 
ourselves....Unless we have faith in 
the persistence of our self, our 
feeling of identity is threatened and 
we become dependent on other 
people...Only a person who has faith in
himself is able to be faithful to j
others, because only he can be sure
that he will be the same at a future
'time as he is today....' [2]
Thus faith, so often seen as the cornerstone 
of religion, is not a matter of belief - but is
a character trait. Fromm gives a fuller account 
of faith, understood in this sense, in The 
Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. At one time 
lack of faith was no more than constructive 
criticism of beliefs that were authoritarian, and 
to that extent could be viewed as a positive 
characteristic.
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However, as Fromm grew older, he began to 
see that to attack authoritarianism was not 
enough (see the posthumous volume On Disobedience 
and Other E s s a y s K f1981)K  Carried to the 
extreme, the so-called 'rational certainty' that 
is opposed to 'irrational faith' becomes a front 
for a profound uncertainty which makes people 
vulnerable to new philosophies that are 
themselves unhelpful - and constitutes a lack of 
faith in a much more negative sense.
Fromm devotes a section of his, so far, 
final text. The Art of Being [1993], to these 
'unhelpful' philosophies. They include
transcendental meditation, and other 'no effort' 
approaches to religion and self-improvement,
'Another barrier to the art of being is 
the 'no effort, no pain' doctrine....
Take our entire method of 
education.... In the name of 'self- 
expression', 'anti-achievement', 
'freedom' we make every course as easy 
and pleasant as possible.
....The professor who insists on hard 
work is called 'authoritarian' or old-
184
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Predictably, Fromm blames this state of affairs 
on economic conditions;
for half-educated people who work in
really are the result of the careful and mature
185
s
fashioned.' [3]
:rv;1
i'The increasing need for technicians,
service industries, requires people
' .-3"with a smattering of knowledge as our 
colleges provide it. Second, our whole 
social system rests upon the fictitious
belief that nobody is forced to do what : .033'=:he does, but that he likes to do it.
%This replacement of overt by anonymous 
authority finds its expression in all 
walks of life. Force is camouflaged by 
consent, the consent is brought about 
by methods of mass suggestion,' [4]
At this point, Fromm makes a useful 0
differentiation between decisions made as the
result of a temporary whim, and those which 3,i:
decision making that is characteristic of the 
productive character,
'Following a whim is, in fact, the 
result of deep inner passivity blended 
with a wish to avoid boredom. Will is 
based on activity, whim on passivity.'
[5]
'To sum up: The chief rationalisation
for the obsession with arbitrariness is 
the concept of antiauthoritarianism.
To be sure, the fight against 
authoritarianism was and still is of 
great positive significance. But 
antiauthoritarianism can - and has - 
become a rationalization for 
narcissistic self-indulgence, for a 
child-like sybaritic life of unimpaired 
pleasure, in which, according to 
Herbert Marcuse, even the primacy of 
genital sexuality is authoritarian, 
because it restricts the freedom of
186
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pregenital - ie anal- perversions.
Finally the fear of authoritarianism 
serves to rationalize a kind of 
madness, a desire to escape from 
reality.' [6]
This passage, in itself, shows how pervasive 
authoritarianism is. Fromm, more than most, 
realised the dangers both of authoritarianism, 
and of a mindless anti-authoritarianism.
I[He was fully aware that we are subject to influences of which we are not fully conscious - 
but would he have recognised the authoritarian 
homophobia implicit in this passage?]
To indicate that Fromm, himself, was subject to 
the hidden dangers against which he warned does 
not, necessarily, invalidate his argument - it 
may, indeed, illustrate it.
Neither extreme is productive, and another 
approach must be found. Fromm begins with the 
idea of rational versus irrational doubt. Both 
of these are attributes that colour a person's 
personality.
s]
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The extreme form of irrational doubt is a form of 
neurosis which causes the individual to doubt 
everything and makes decision making well-nigh 
impossible. However, the typical contemporary :
form of doubt produces the attitude of 
indifference described above, where everything is 
possible but nothing is certain. Such an attitude 
leaves the individual feeling isolated, 
bewildered and powerless, with no firm 
convictions of his own and open to manipulation 
by others. Real individual freedom is lost and
a productive outcome is impossible.
Rational doubt, however, is directed at 
authoritarian teaching, which must be evaluated 
by the individual before it is accepted. It is
I
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a process of growth by means of which the 
individual comes to know his own views and to be 
himself.
Similarly, faith can be rational or 
irrational. Irrational faith does not depend on 
the individual's own experience, whereas rational 
faith does; whether we are referring to faith in 
God or faith in a loved one. Rational faith in 
God could exist only where the individual had 
personal experience of God.
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Moreover, in Fromm's opinion, the links 
between the kind of person who is free to have 
this experience and the one who has escaped from 
authoritarianism and has begun to live as a 
productive, humanistic personality have become 
clear. Thus the prophetic insistence on freedom 
is justified, since the individual cannot 
develop productively unless s/he is free to do 
so, and is not prevented from taking a principled 
stance which may be contrary to that of society 
as a whole.
3. Conscience.
who literally, and sometimes forcibly, have 'laid 
down the law'. The response to such training is
Inextricable from the idea of character is 
Fromm's description of the manner in which 
conscience is formed - in ways that may be 
authoritarian or humanistic. The authoritarian 
conscience has been formed by some authority 
outwith the individual, usually by parents or
I
teachers (who themselves have been conditioned by 
the social character of their own society) and
I 
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motivated by the fear of punishment for wrong­
doing and the rewards of 'good', that is, 
obedient, behaviour, and is invariably determined 
by the commands and prohibitions of authority. 
Such an individual will obey the law even when 
that law is demonstrably unjust and tyrannical. 
(Fromm gives a full description of how this comes 
about in The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness.)
The point here is that the authoritarian 
conscience is linked to those forms of religion
which equate obedience with virtue. Thus, as we 
have seen, in Christian teaching the disobedience 
of Adam and Eve is equated with original sin; 
whereas Fromm understands it as the first step on 
the road to freedom, comparable with Prometheus' 
theft of fire from the Gods. In both stories, 
disobedience is punished by an authoritarian and 
vengeful God or gods. From this it follows that 
much religious teaching is based on the concept 
of obedience to authority - a concept that limits 
growth towards individual productive freedom. 
Fromm believes we greatly underestimate the 
authoritarian component in contemporary life, or
191
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the extent to which internalised authority 
influences decision making.
The humanistic conscience, on the other 
hand, is our own voice - which approves and gives 
a feeling of 'rightness' to those actions that 
are conducive to our proper functioning and full 
development.
(There seems to be a close relationship between 
this idea and The Society of Friends' concept of 
'that of God' in every man, which will lead to 
right action, if heeded.)
This conscience is based on those principles of 
living that we have discovered for ourselves or 
have found to be true to life in our experience. 
The possessor of the humanistic conscience would 
no more allow himself to become the tool of 
others than he would seek to exploit others for 
his own purposes. Mutual love and respect is the 
keynote of the humanistic society.
How does Fromm account for the rarity of the 
humanistic conscience, of individuals who can see 
the world clearly, as it is, and act according to 
their own best judgement? As he sees it, this is 
partly because we live in a society where 
authoritarianism is, and has been, dominant, and
■
partly because we have lost the ability to listen 
to our own authentic voice. People are afraid of 
being alone and seek to lose themselves in 
continuous activity, Those who have learned to 
live productively and to be still and listen to, 
and follow the guidance of, the voice of their 
own authentic conscience continue to grow 
mentally and emotionally into old age; whereas 
those who have lived their lives in a continuous 
round of (in Fromm's terms) unproductive 
activity, deteriorate as their physical health 
wanes. In reality, of course, both forms of 
conscience are present in everyone - what matters 
is that we should try to become aware of how our 
reactions are being conditioned and make a 
conscious effort to move in a humanistic 
direction.
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4.Schaar's Response
to Fromm's Anti-authoritarianism.
Fromm's views on authoritarianism are 
clearly crucial to his whole approach; yet it is 
this aspect of his thought that is most severely 
challenged in John M. Schaar's Escape from 
Authority.(1961  ^ It is necessary, therefore, to 
look at this issue in some detail, the more so as 
Fromm's attitude to religion is closely bound up 
to his attitude to authority.
At the outset, Schaar makes clear his 
profound disagreement with Fromm's position:
'as soon as one says that man is man 
and not God...he parts company with 
Fromm....1 am morally convinced that to 
tell man he is perfect, as Fromm does, 
is to expose him to unnecessary dangers 
and excite him to catastrophic 
adventures'. [7]
Nothing in the above outline of Fromm's views 
would warrant such a statement; but, in addition, 
in his concept of 'alternativism' he expressly
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states that the individual is equally disposed 
towards good and evil and must make the choice.
He has the potentiality, in the messianic time, 
to become perfect - but Fromm had no illusions 
regarding his present condition.
Schaar assures us that, like Fromm, he i
yearns for 'the noble city on the hill', but 
adds :
'It seems to me, on the other hand, 
that God's City might better be put 
back in heaven, where it was before the 
eighteenth century. Located there, it 
is certainly harmless, probably 
beneficial, and possibly even true.'
[8]
I doubt very much whether Schaar actually 
holds a pre-eighteenth century view of heaven, 
which he would have to do, if his last phrase is 
to be taken seriously - at times he allows an 
unreasonably strong reaction to Fromm to take the 
place of reasoned discourse. This spoils his own 
argument and strengthens Fromm's argument that we 
all are subject to unconscious impulses of which
194
we are not consciously aware.
In any case it is obvious that there is unlikely 
to be a meeting of minds.
Schaar, like Fromm, speaks of our own age 
as being more than normally problematic:
know that this time the disaster could 
be total.’ [9]
Fromm, Schaar considers, offers three 
responses to shipwreck:
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'Our age fears, as few others have, 
that the problematic seems headed for 
the chaotic. We fear shipwreck; and we
Fromm and Schaar, writing in the nineteen fifties 
and sixties, both shared the widely held fear of 
nuclear disaster - but, more than that, like 
Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) they considered that 
morality itself had broken down. (This is 
discussed further in the final chapter.)
; :
1. To party, and eat, drink and be merry as 
the ship goes down.
2. To follow a leader who claims to have 'a 
secret chart and an unsinkable boat'.
3. To look on helplessly, unable either to 
ignore the situation or to act upon it.
He gives no specific instances in Fromm's 
work to substantiate this view, and, without such 
support this seems to be a rather bizarre account 
of Fromm's position.
Schaar's own view is that:
' In a time like our own the ideas of 
the shipwrecked are the most worth 
reading, for any man who today does not 
know he is lost is lost without hope.
He will never find himself or guide 
others. The Liberal epoch has run its 
course.... It can no longer be denied 
that Western man .... does not know 
what he really wants. Lacking that 
knowledge, and therefore lacking the 
power to gain fulfilments. Western man 
now shows himself hostile to life, and 
perhaps prepared to destroy it.' [10]
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He commends Fromm for recognising this and for 
seeking 'something of value beyond it' [11] but 
scorns his solution;
'Fromm's solution reads in substance; 
since we lack faith, and know not where 
to go, let us cleave together in love, 
while we search for ourselves in our 
work'. [12]
This again, is less than accurate; in 
Fromm's view we work towards becoming our 
productive selves by becoming aware of the forces 
within, and of social forces outside ourselves, 
which are influencing our actions - we are then 
in a position to make a reasoned decision as to 
the right course of action in the circumstances.
In Schaar's view, the problem is not, as 
Fromm thinks, the problem of irrational 
authority, but 'the absence of all authority 
properly so called'.
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' Fromm thinks that if we can only 
banish the irrational authorities .... 
reason and beauty will flourish. This 
is just not enough. Men will be ruled.
The majority of men lack the power to 
form their own conceptions of the real 
and the ideal. Therefore, there must 
be guiding ideals, and there must be 
uniform and authoritative rules based 
on the guiding ideals. There must also 
be men who represent and embody the 
ideals, and who make and enforce the 
rules based on them.' [13]
ISchaar does not say where these guiding ideals are to come from, nor who is to choose the 
enforcers of the rules. As it stands, this seems 
to be an invitation to dictatorship, nor is there 
any guarantee that it would be a benevolent 
dictatorship. However, the lack of this firm 
authoritarian structure is seen by Schaar to 
underlie the moral breakdown that is 
characteristic of contemporary life.
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Schaar's own argument in favour of the 
authoritarian position is based on the myth of 
the civilised 'walled city' which must be 
defended against the barbarians, and the
symbolism of 'the dying king'.[14]
[MacIntyre uses the idea, of attack by the 
barbarians, metaphorically - but Schaar uses it 
much more strongly as the foundation of his 
position, in much the same way as Fromm uses the 
Jewish story of the creation.]
■ VOn the strength of these myths, Schaar 
argues that Fromm is inadequate because he does 
not go beyond the formula ' liberate man from
irrational authorities' , without offering a clear 
idea of what, precisely, they are to do with 
their liberty. There seems to be some force in 
this charge. It is not clear, however, that
Schaar offers enough evidence for his claim that 
the only, and necessary, alternative to
authority is domination by fashion and the whim 
of the moment. Surely some, at least of those 
who are given their freedom will make good use of 
it.
■
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Alternatives to irrational authority are 
rational authority, or some form of democracy, 
not, necessarily, license. However, Schaar is 
convinced that what Fromm is recommending is 'the 
slavery of unlimited desire'. [15]
He reiterates that Fromm:
' cannot see that authority must rest 
upon positive conceptions of duty and 
the good life. He cannot see that his
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advocacy of the democratic principle, 
as he has defined it, is really an 
advocacy of fashion and passion, made 
attractive by the understanding that 
all men have an equal right to see 
their desires gratified.' [16] i
Overall it would appear that Schaar is more 
concerned to make his own case for 
authoritarianism, than to do justice to Fromm. 
On the other hand, we have seen that Fromm, 
himself, came to see that anti-authoritarianism, 
per se, could be destructive. Moreover, Schaar 
rightly points to the difficulties involved when
offer would seem to have more dangerous
to some form of totalitarianism.
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attempting to resolve questions that lie on the 
border of politics, and he raises an
uncomfortable point in his claim that democracy, 
as at present practised, can come close to 
government by 'fashion'. Fromm's mature
characters are needed to make democracy work as 
it should - but any alternative at present on
drawbacks. It is not clear what Schaar has to
: :offer in its place that would not eventually lead
5. Aggression/Needs.
Fromm's views on aggression are contained in 
the lengthy volume The Anatomy of Human 
Destructiveness. Much of the earlier part of 
this text is given over to the discussion of 
earlier, and alternative, views of aggression. 
However, here, it is proposed to concentrate on 
the outlines of Fromm's own position, insofar as 
it has a bearing on earlier parts of this essay. 
He divides aggression into its socially useful
i
and its dangerous forms.
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Benign aggression is an inherent defensive 
mechanism which is essential for human survival. 
Mankind's nearest relatives, the chimpanzees, 
have a similar degree of inbuilt aggression and 
lead relatively peaceful and non-violent lives. 
Man, however, is the most unnecessarily 
aggressive species and Fromm finds the 
explanation of this in the concept of 'malignant 
aggression' - up to a point this can be accounted 
for by the fact that many, perhaps the majority, 
of people are living in conditions of 
overcrowding and restricted freedom that would 
produce aggressive behaviour in any species. 
However, this is insufficient to account for 
individual acts of cruelty and destruction such 
as are found in no other species.
The importance of the individual character
structure has already been emphasised. Here 
Fromm relates it to his own concept of 
existential (as opposed to physical) needs.
In his view, these are:
.1
The need for an object of devotion ~ this 
can be devotion to God, love or truth - any 
worthwhile aim in life would serve the purpose 
and produce a positive outcome; however, the 
worship of destructive idols will produce 
negative (aggressive) outcomes.
The need for relatedness is fulfilled by 
love or kindness - but its negative version 
produces dependence, sadism, masochism and 
destruction.
The need for unity and rootedness is located 
in solidarity, brotherliness, love and mystical 
experience, or alternatively, by drunkenness, 
drug addiction and depersonalisation.
The need for effectiveness answered by love 
and productive work or by sadism and 
destructiveness.
The need for stimulation and excitation 
fulfilled by a productive interest in man, 
nature, art or ideas - or by a greedy pursuit of 
ever-changing pleasures.
At a common-sense level, to disagree with 
the proposition that the positive features of 
this list are greatly to be desired, is rather
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like objecting to motherhood and apple pie - but, 
as Patricia Springborg has shown in The Problem 
of Human Needs and the Critique of 
Civilisation,[171 this list will not stand up as 
a list of 'needs' comparable to biological needs.
The problem with Fromm's list is that these 
needs, as described, overlap. 'Relatedness' is 
akin to 'rootedness'; the 'need for 
transcendence' could be satisfied in much the 
same way as the 'need for a frame of orientation 
and devotion'; and, to complete the circle, it is 
difficult to distinguish the 'need for identity’ 
from those of 'relatedness' and 'rootedness'. 
Ultimately, they are all functions of 'productive 
love' - 'or relations which combine love, 
effectiveness and reason'.[18]
Moreover, there is a confusion between needs 
and motivation:
'If we look carefully at the catalogue 
of existential needs that he gives, we 
find that there is little or no point 
in calling them needs at all. What he 
is presenting is a set of cultural
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values or normative stipulations. If 
the needs of relatedness, 
transcendence, rootedness, identity and 
a frame of orientation and devotion 
were really 'needs'; man would show a 
greater propensity to satisfy them, if 
not indeed a compulsion, and they would 
not be problematic at all.' [19]
'What we see in Fromm's catalogue of 
existential needs is a set of 
prescriptions for resolving the 
universal problems of human existence. '
[20]
As such, they have their place in social 
criticism but they do not have the biological 
force that Fromm ascribes to them.
However, in Fromm's account, these 
characteristics tend to occur in clusters, so 
that an individual is oriented towards the 
positive outcome in each case or towards the 
negative. In the first case, he would be 
described as 'biophilic', and in the negative
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case as ’necrophilic' - as his choices are life- 
destroying. Fromm argues that healthy
development leads to biophilia. When necrophilia 
occurs, as it does all too frequently, man's 
natural development becomes distorted and 
destructive.
Fromm took the term 'necrophilia' from 
Miguel de Unamuno, (who used it as a term of 
contempt in a passionate speech against the 
leader of the Falangists), but admits that the 
idea of conflict between striving for life and 
striving for death came from Freud. Yet, as 
ever, he took over the idea only to 'reformulate' 
it.
'Freud's idea guided me to see clinical 
data in a new light and to re-formulate 
- and thus to preserve - Freud's 
concept on a different theoretical 
basis...' [21]
He continues :
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'Necrophilia in the characterological 
sense can be described as the 
passionate attraction to all that is 
dead, decayed, putrid, sickly; it is 
the passion to transform that which is 
alive into something unalive; to 
destroy for the sake of destruction; 
the exclusive interest in all that is 
purely mechanical. It is the passion 
to tear apart living structures. [22]
One begins reading this definition with a 
sense of unreality; surely this applies only to 
a few sick people? But by the time we reach 
'destroy for the sake of destruction' we can see 
the relationship to our own times. Fromm
devotes many pages of his text to the connection 
between 'necrophilia' and 'malignant aggression'. 
Here, it is possibly sufficient to establish 
Fromm's belief that much of the apparently 
inherent destuctiveness in humanity is due to the 
failure to develop towards the mature, 
independent, 'productive' character which would 
represent mankind's optimal development. As we 
have seen previously, in Fromm's thinking
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economic and social conditions are related to 
individual psychology. Present conditions
depersonalise the individual and so encourage 
necrophilous growth. For optimal development, 
man needs 'freedom, activating stimuli, the 
absence of exploitative control and the presence 
of man-centred modes of production'. [23]
Unfortunately, men have been brainwashed to the 
point where they are no longer aware of what is i
needed to further their own maximal growth.
Their real needs have become confused with 
socially conditioned wants which are not in their 
own best interest.
It follows from the foregoing that Fromm 
will consider that any behaviour that serves to 
promote humanity's well-being is (in Fromm’s 
vocabulary) rational; whereas anything that tends 
to weaken or destroy an individual's potential 
for growth is seen as irrational. Irrational 
behaviour is not instinctive behaviour - a person 
becomes irrational because his natural 
development has been stunted.
(Statements like this leave him open to Schaar's 
charge of 'naturalism' - but Fromm is not 
recommending a Rousseau-like return to nature,
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merely that individuals should not be prevented 
from 'normal' development by adverse factors, be 
they individual or social.)
Thus the major human motivations may include 
the rational passions of love, tenderness, 
solidarity, freedom and truth - or the irrational 
passions which include drives to control, to 
submit, to destroy; as well as narcissism, greed, 
envy and ambition. Any one individual will have 
drives from both groups which can, on occasion, 
be held in a creative tension - but usually one 
constellation will predominate. Under ideal 
conditions only the life-enhancing drives would 
develop and the destructive drives would be 
repressed or severely weakened.
In real life, however, destructiveness is 
always present, and may be activated in 
apparently 'normal' people under extreme 
conditions of war, poverty or extreme 
deprivation. Current examples could be found in 
Bosnia or Rwanda. This 'spontaneous' destruction 
must be distinguished from the permanently 
destructive character, though no doubt such 
characters may be found among the more fanatical 
leaders who incite mass destruction. Each
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individual, however, will demonstrate both 
biophilic and necrophilic tendencies, but, if 
mankind is not to precipitate its own 
destruction, it is the life promoting features 
which should be nurtured - and these come 
remarkably close the virtues of love and justice
promoted by the Old Testament prophets. The
■ :■unfettered humanistic conscience is.
anevertheless, mankind's best guide to life 
enhancing progress - since the authoritarian 
conscience is destructive of individual freedom. 
In Fromm's opinion, religion can be either 
authoritarian or humanistic. An omniscient, 
paternal God is plainly authoritarian, but Fromm
%I
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sees in the idea of a covenant with God the 
beginning of a breakthough to a more humanistic 
position. Taking his lead from Bachofen, Fromm 
equates paternalism with authoritarianism; but 
sees maternalism as being humanistic. Calvinism 
and Lutheran protestantism are seen as being 
strictly paternalistic, while the paternalism of 
Roman Catholicism is moderated by the worship of 
Mary.
This equating of paternalism with 
authoritarianism is more or less traditional.
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6. Conclusion
211
y
#f
certainly it is not peculiar to Fromm - but if 
fathers are to be ’productive', in Fromm's own 
terms, they must be allowed to interpret the role 
for themselves, as mothers struggle to re-
I
Like many other social critics, Fromm sees
clearly many of the dangers facing contemporary 
■society, but his prescription is, at times, 
utopian, and is frequently difficult to follow. 
However, his strength is that he does realise
that there can be no easy answers and he gives
reasons for this. Unconscious, as well as 
conscious, factors determine behaviour; the 
individual is important, but so is society as a 
whole and both are determined by the very 
economic and ideological factors which they help 
to create.
.Crucial in all this are the left-wing German 
workers whose conscious ideas were overthrown by 
their unconscious authoritarian tendencies when 
they were faced with the apparent attractions of 
National Socialism. This discovery, which
i-
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excited Fromm's prophetic tendencies, became the 
starting point for his social criticism and for 
his remedy for present ills. Unless people are 
fully aware of the forces that are at work in 
themslves and in society, they will be incapable
of taking the radical and reasonable steps that
would be necesary to put things right.
I
4:,:
Where Said relied on reasoned argument to 
advance the cause of freedom and justice that 
was so dear to Fromm:
'What I care about as an intellectual 
is what I say before an audience or to 
a constituency, and what my 
representations are about is not only 
how I articulate them, but what I 
represent, as someone whose main 
concern it is to advance the cause of 
freedom and justice. I say or write 
these things because, after much 
reflection, they are what I believe; 
and I also want to persuade others of 
this view.' [24]
Fromm himself realised that individuals were 
not able to respond freely or fully to such an
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appeal until they became aware of the unconscious 
factors which determined their behaviour. 
Remembering the German workers, he knew that 
intellectual consent was not enough and that what 
was true in the case of the individual was true 
for society as a whole. On the other hand a 
direct appeal to the emotions such as that made 
by charismatic figures, be they religious 
evangelists or politicians, could be even more 
dangerous, since such leaders tend to appeal 
primarily to those with insufficiently developed 
critical faculties. As he saw it, unless people 
became aware of the ways in which, for example, 
market forces affect the everyday lives of 
individuals, they cannot make rational political 
choices.
The Old Testament prophets could be said to 
have been aware of a connection between economic 
conditions, the social character and the ideology 
of the people as a whole, but they did not speak 
directly to the individual.
[In Amos 2:6-12, the prophet specifies the social 
sickness of Israel - the people have been
213
ideology - they are no longer true to YHWH, they 
have dismissed the prophets and their religious
able to stand against the trend. Said describes 
such an individual in the final paragraph of his 
first lecture:
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involved in slavery; have trampled on the poor 
and ignored the needy. Moreover, they have 
become sexually amoral, and fly in the face of 
traditional values. All this at a time when they
,are enjoying unprecedented prosperity. This is 
linked by the prophet with their change in
i
practices have lost their original content. 
Therefore God's message to the people is that 
they will be punished, as a people.1
To the triumvarate of economic conditions, 
social character and ideology, Fromm added an 
understanding of individual psychology and when 
this whole complex seems to be heading for 
destruction, as he sees it, the only hope is that 
enough individuals have become sufficiently aware 
of their own and their society's situation to be
I
passively unwilling, but actively 
willing to say so in public.' [25]
The person who can do this is very close to
'...there are two core doctrines
„:4
'At bottom, the intellectual in my 
sense of the word is neither a pacifier 
nor a consensus builder, but someone 
whose whole being is staked on a 
critical sense, a sense of being 
unwilling to accept easy formulas, or i:ready-made cliches, or the smooth ever 
so accommodating confirmations of what 
the powerful or conventional have to 
say and what they do. Not just
becoming Fromm's 'productive' individual.
Fromm has been criticised for his essays 
into mysticism and Zen Buddhism, but given the 
importance he places on ' awareness' in his scheme 
of things - it was not unreasonable for him to 
look at techniques that are reputed to increase 
this faculty.
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acceptable to many who, like myself.
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are not Buddhists, yet are deeply jg
,3Rimpressed by the core of Buddhist 
teaching. I refer, first of all, to 
the doctrine that the goal of life is 
to overcome greed, hate, and ignorance.
In this respect Buddhism does not 
basically differ from Jewish and
Christian ethical norms. More
important.... is another element of 
Buddhist thinking: the demand for
optimal awareness of the processes 
inside and outside oneself.' [26]
Though this attempt to draw individual, 
social, and spiritual factors, together with 
their economical and ideological environment, 
into one cohesive structure was open to 
criticism, Fromm has demonstrated the need for 
a co-ordinated approach to the explanation of 
complex human behaviour, and has shown that 
attempts to account for our present condition
'B!BBBB
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simply in terms of economic, social or historical 
factors, or alternatively, in terms of moral 
decline, must always be insufficient.
;Sg
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CHAPTER 5
Was Fromm a prophet?
Earlier in this thesis I have argued that the 
abrupt and significant change in Fromm's output, 
subsequent to his study of working class 
attitudes in Weimar Germany and his exile to 
America, was an indication of his perception of 
himself as having made a revelatory discovery 
which he felt obliged to share. In addition, I 
have tried to show, using illustrations from his 
writings, how he linked this experience to that 
of the Old Testament prophets to the extent that 
he saw himself as having been called upon to play 
a prophetic role. Therefore, it now becomes 
necessary to consider whether he had reasonable 
grounds for this belief - and this, in turn, 
depends upon the definition given to the term 
'prophet'.
Fromm's own definition, as we have seen, was 
derived from the conventional Jewish view of the 
prophets as religious teachers combined with the 
view, common towards the end of the last century 
and the beginning of this century, of the
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(implicitly) and Michael Walzer (explicitly). 
By this I mean that Said's intellectual and 
Walzer's social critic/prophet have so much in 
common that it is difficult to draw a clear line 
between them. Said never expressly uses the term 
'prophet', but it is clear that his intellectuals 
are performing the same function in society as 
Walzer's social critic/prophet.
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prophets as social critics and intellectuals.
Neither of these views of the prophets would be 
regarded as unproblematic by all contemporary 
theologians, but in Fromm's youth such an 
understanding of the prophets would be widely 
accepted. However, Fromm's idiosyncratic attempt 
to present the prophets as humanistic social 
critics concerned only with the denunciation of 
idolatry, without reference to the God whose 
prophets they were, in fact, amounts to an 
attempt to mould them into his own image and 
would certainly not have been accepted by any 
competent biblical scholar.
Nevertheless, the view of the prophet as an 
intellectual and social critic is still widely
held and informs the work of both Edward Said i
^ 1'31
However, by combining the insights of these 
writers, I believe it is possible to arrive at a 
description of a contemporary prophet, which 
would be applicable to Erich Fromm - looking 
first at Said's understanding of the intellectual 
as social critic and moving on from there to : i
Waltzer's account of the social critic as 
prophet.
1, The intellectual as socal critic.
'Î
This part of the argument is derived from 
Edward Said's Reith Lectures given in 1993 and 
entitled The Role of the Intellectual.
In his first lecture. Said differentiated
:between Gramsci's division of intellectuals into 
two broad types; 'traditional intellectuals',
(teachers, priests and administrators), whose 
role remains the same throughout the generations 
and 'organic intellectuals' who prostitute their 
abilities in the service of those who hold the 
strings of power in their generation - and 
Julien Benda's view of intellectuals as a select 
group of highly intelligent and ideally motivated
I
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social critics who are prepared to suffer and, if 
need be, die for their beliefs.
It is clear that Said's view comes close to 
that of Benda:
'The central fact for me is, I think, 
that the intellectual is an individual 
endowed with a facility for lirrepresenting, embodying, articulating 
a message, a view, an attitude, 
philosophy or opinion to, as well as
'for, a public, in public. And this role 
has an edge to it, and cannot be played 
without a sense of being someone whose 
place it is to raise embarrassing
;questions, to confront orthodoxy and
dogma (rather than produce them), to 
be someone who cannot easily be co­
opted by governments or corporations, 
and whose raison d'etre is to represent 
all those people and issues who are 
routinely forgotten or swept under the 
rug.' [1]
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SFromm fits comfortably into neither of 
Gramsci's definitions, as quoted by Said, he was 
not content to remain securely within the bounds
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of his own academic competence (in psychology) 
nor did he make any attempt to gain the approval 
of those in power in his adopted country.
Therefore, if he was an intellectual at all he 
belonged in the category, defined by Said, of 
intellectual as social critic. There is no 
denying that he was an individual who had a view 
which he attempted to convey directly to the 
general public and one for which he was prepared 
to stand up and be counted - he did not lie low 
during the McCarthy years, when to be a public 
supporter of Marxist ideas in the U.S.A. was to
'risk being regarded as an enemy of the state - 
not an easy position for one who had already been
.
forced into exile to escape persecution.
Nevertheless, his contribution was not 
sufficiently distinguished for him to be compared 
to the select band of Benda's intellectuals, who 
included Socrates and Jesus as well as Spinoza,
Voltaire and Renan. However, to be an
intellectual by Said's criteria does not demand 
views that are beyond criticism, simply that they
I
,3J
fI
I
be sincerely believed, publicly proclaimed and 
courageously upheld. Fromm qualifies on these 
counts.
However, while he was not afraid to ask 
embarrassing questions regarding the values 
broadly held in capitalist states, as we have 
seen, it could be argued that he confronted 
capitalist orthodoxy with Marxist orthodoxy, an
■
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undoubted failing insofar as it was a blinkered 
view, but which nevertheless served to draw
attention to issues which were ’routinely 
forgotten or swept under the rug' in Western 
society. Thus his Marxism does not prevent him 
from qualifying as an intellectual in Said's 
terms.
Said quotes C. Wright Mills in this 
connection :
'The independent artist and 
intellectual are among the few 
remaining personalities equipped to 
resist and to fight the stereotyping 
and consequent death of genuinely 
living things. Fresh perception now 
involves the capacity to continually
■:t3.224
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unmask and to smash the stereotypes of 
vision and intellect with which modern 
communications [that is, modern systems 
of representation] swamp u s ' [2]
Fromm would have agreed with every word! In the 
foreward to To Have or To Be he comments:
'The dream of being independent masters 
of our lives ended when we began 
awakening to the fact that we have all 
become cogs in the bureaucratic 
machine, with our thoughts, feelings, 
and tastes manipulated by government 
and industry and the mass 
communications that they control.' [3]
As elsewhere, Fromm was able to point to an 
anxiety that was widely felt, but in this book, 
especially, the effort to approach the problem 
through the familiar mixture of popular 
psychology and Marxist theory produced an awkward 
and distorted text. Increasingly, in the later
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titles, ideas that seemed promising in Fear of 
Freedom and Man for Himself became elaborated 
almost into meaninglessness. The basic premise 
of To Have or To B e . which I take to be that 
there is something far wrong with a life lived 
under international, bureaucratic consumerism, 
is, at least, worth arguing - but it gets lost in 
a melange of psuedo mysticism, unargued 
psychology and Marxism that is exasperating to 
the sympathetic reader, who senses that under all 
this waffle there are points that should be, and 
are not being, made. Sadly, Fromm was unaware
of the extent to which he remained in thrall to 
the stereotypes of Marxist teaching - to him they 
remained new, fresh and challenging. He was well 
aware of the stereotypes of the West but was 
unable sufficiently to recognise those implicit 
in communism.
This limitation of vision is of especial 
concern to Said, who, however, is not 
particularly troubled by the limitations of 
Marxism, since he shares the general view that 
communism lost its force with the destruction of 
the Berlin Wall. Instead, he draws attention to 
the rise of nationalism and the tendency always
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to think in terms of 'us' and 'them'.
'There seems to be no way of escaping 
the frontiers or enclosures built 
around us either by nations or by other 
kinds of communities. . . .they take place 
in the post-Cold War context provided 
by a United States' domination of the 
Western alliance, in which a consensus 
has emerged about resurgent or 
fundamentalist Islam being the new 
threat that has replaced communism. 
Here corporate thinking has not made 
intellectuals into the questioning and 
sceptical individual minds about which 
I have been speaking, but rather into 
a chorus that echoes the prevailing 
view...and into a gradually more and 
more irrational sense that 'we' are 
being threatened by 'them'. [4]
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What Said does not make explicit here is the 
extent to which this new nationalism serves the 
purposes of the arms manufacturers rather than of 
any one nation, or the extent to which the 
economies of the West seem to be dependent upon 
the supply of arms to the second and third world. 
Nor does he deal with the dangers inherent in the 
manipulation of language, so that 'profit* 
replaces 'efficiency' as though the two terms 
were synonymous. They are not; 'efficiency' is 
a scientific/technical term relating to the ratio 
between input and output - the output of a car 
assembly line is cars - whether the money 
obtained for those cars is distributed to the 
shareholders, paid to the employees, or returned 
to the buyers as a discount is another matter - 
an efficient organisation, in human terms, will 
have the well-being of people as its aim and will 
be concerned for those who make the product or 
provide the service, as well as those who finance 
it and make use of it. The most efficient 
organisation, in these terms, would be the one 
that produced the best balance between these 
conflicting interests.
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Fromm was aware of the ways in which the 
emotional context as well as the intellectual use 
of language can be manipulated to serve the ends 
of international organisations who have no 
concern beyond the balance sheet, and for whom 
'the bottom line' has become the ultimate good.
His concept of the 'social character' of a 
particular era could be useful in demonstrating 
how the complex matrix of individual and social 
pressures determines outcomes which are not 
consciously desired or envisaged by those who are 
most effected by them. Yet his own efforts to 
do this are flawed by his attempts to press the 
new wine of his later insights into the old 
bottle of his original thesis. If he had stuck 
to a more rigorous social psychology, stripped of 
mysticism, and with a less blinkered approach to 
Marxism, he might have produced a useful critique 
of consumer society.
Said believes (lecture 3) that 'expatriates 
and marginals' are in a particularly strong 
position to view their adopted culture with the 
degree of detachment that is necessary to form 
a fresh and unbiased view of its strengths and
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'endlessly fascinating man whose entire
remained in America until shortly 
before his death)...his years in 
America stamped him with the marks of 
exile forever.* [5]
It was not so much the years in America, as the 
totally unexpected experience of finding himself 
regarded as an undesirable alien in his own 
country that was so traumatic. As we saw in part 
I, only Fromm and Lowenthal among the members of 
the Frankfurt Institut were ever practising Jews, 
and none of them saw their Jewish descent as 
overriding their German nationality. Be that as 
it may, Said, himself an exile, sees this
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weaknesses. He cites Adorno, who had been a 
colleague of Fromm's in the Frankfurt School and 
exiled with him, as an
career skirted and fought the dangers 
of fascism. Communism and Western mass 
consumerism. 1:i....although Adorno returned to
-,Frankfurt in 1949 (unlike Fromm who
I
condition as being particularly favourable to the 
critical, detached view so necessary to the 
intellectual as social critic.
'Because the exile sees things both in 
terms of what has been left behind and
Perhaps exile need not be geographical to 
function in this sense. When Fromm left behind 
the religion which had given meaning to the 
earlier years of his life, he may well have 
suffered a degree of trauma or 'exile' similar to 
that which was described by Tolstoy in his ^
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what is actual here and now, there is 
a double perspective that never sees
things in isolation. Every scene or 
situation in the new country 
necessarily draws on its counterparts 
in the old country. From that 
juxtaposition one gets a better, 
perhaps even more universal, idea of 
how to think, say, about a human rights 
issue in one situation by comparison
.with another.' [6]
I
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Confession. [which is the first essay in 
A.N.Wilson's collection of Tolstoy's religious 
writings, The Lion and the Honeycomb.1
'My heart was now full of despair that 
there was no God at all, I repeated:
"Lord have mercy on me, save me! Lord, 
my God teach m e . " But no one had mercy 
on me and I felt my life was coming to 
a standstill....my source of life dried 
up and I fell into despair, thinking 
there was nothing left but to kill 
myself. And the worst thing of all was 
that I was unable to do this. All this
I'happened to me not two or three times,
'but dozens and hundreds of times. '
[ 7 ]
Î3:The loss of a secure religious faith at an 
impressionable age, can be a deeply disturbing 
experience. Such an event might account for his 
seeming compulsion to attempt to reconcile the 
Marxism, and to a lesser extent the Freudianism, 
which he had adopted as his new mental 'country' , 
with the Judaism which he had left behind. If I
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unchangeable, permanent, irreversible. ' 
[8]
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am right about this, he was an exile on both 
counts.
'A second advantage to what is in 
effect the exile standpoint for an 
intellectual is that you do tend to see 
things not simply as they are, but as 
they have come to be that way. Look at 
situations as contingent, not as
inevitable; look at them as the result 
of a series of historical choices made 
by men and women, as facts of society 
made by human beings, and not as
natural and God given, and therefore
There is no doubt that Fromm did so look at 
American society. He viewed human existence in 
terms of existential and historical dichotomies.
The former are unavoidable, but historical 
contradictions are not.
■3,II
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'The contemporary contradiction between 
an abundance of technical means for 
material satisfaction and the 
incapacity to use them exclusively for 
the peace and welfare of the people is 
soluble, it is not a necessary 
contradiction but one due to man ' s lack 
of courage and wisdom.' [9]
There is no guarantee, however, that in the 
attempt to account for what one finds in the new 
territory one will not make rationalisations 
which do not stand up to close scrutiny. Fromm's 
vision was cumbered rather than enhanced by the 
mind-set he brought with him from Germany. He 
never broke away from the agenda of the Frankfurt 
School - all his subsequent writings continued 
the attempt to marry Marx with Freud. The 
original idea, that to understand human behaviour 
one must look both at psychological pressures and 
sociological pressures was sound enough, but he 
never got away from the towering figures of Marx, 
whom he revered, and Freud, with whom he carried 
on a continual internal argument.
This is not to question the advantage of
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One of the points Said raises in his fifth 
lecture is the necessity for the intellectual to
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marginality (it is an old adage that the onlooker 
sees most of the game!) but the onlooker's vision 
must be true, and he will not be the best judge 
of that. Fromm's own vision was distorted by 
his inability to see beyond Marxism and his 
ambivalent relationship with Judaism.
apply the same critical standards to one's own
country (and this would apply equally to one's 
own political position) as one does to its
enemies.
'I believe there is a special duty to 
address the constituted and authorised 
powers of one's own society, which are 
responsible to its citizenry,
particularly when those powers are 
e xe r c is ed  in a m a n i f e s t l y  
disproportionate and immoral war, or in 
d e l i b e r a t e  p r o g r a m m e s  of 
discrimination, repression and 
collective cruelty.' [10]
■j
I
There was no shortage of critics of Marxism 
in America during Fromm's sojourn there; however, 
that criticism passed beyond fair comment to a 
démonisation of everything that could, however 
loosely, be attributed to 'Stalinism'. Fromm
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continually complained of the misrepresentation 
of Marxism in America. Meanwhile 'the American
dream' and the emotional patriotism of 'God bless 
America' seemed to disguise much in American
policy that was less than edifying. Said gives 
many examples to show how American behaviour, 
especially in the international sphere, failed to 
match its rhetoric. It can be argued that
Fromm, for all his failings, was serving a 
necessary intellectual purpose by presenting an 
alternative view to the existing American 
hegemony.
Said is particularly critical of those whom 
he describes as 'professional' intellectuals. 
Such people are content to remain within their 
own sphere of expertise, to progress in their 
professions and to play for safety.
s
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'The result is that today's 
intellectual is most likely to be a 
closeted literature professor, with a 
secure income and no interest in 
dealing with the world outside the 
classroom. Such individuals, Jacoby 
alleges, write an esoteric and barbaric 
prose that is meant mainly for academic 
advancement and not for social change.'
[11]
Such a stance was open to Fromm; he held 
professorships in several universities, and it is 
to his credit that he resisted the temptation to 
play safe, which, given his circumstances, must 
have been considerable - and made a concentrated 
effort to draw the attention of the general 
public to what he saw as the dangers of the 
dependence of the West on material values. 
However faulty were some of his arguments, his 
vision was not without truth, as became evident 
when Thatcherite and Reaganite economics came to 
dominate the decade following his death in 1980.
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As Said sees it,
1
’The danger comes from an attitude that
1,1 ■I shall be calling professionalism,
■thinking of your intellectual work as 
something you do for a living .... - 
not rocking the boat, not straying 
outside the accepted paradigms or 
limits, making yourself marketable and 
above all presentable, hence 
uncontroversial and unpolitical and 
objective.' [12]
■
On the face of it Fromm was free of these dangers 
- but he was 'marketable'. However, he appealed 
to the wrong market if he had wished to make 
himself academically respectable, though there is
no evidence that he had any such aim in mind.
Opposed to the 'professionals'. Said places 
the 'amateurs'. Such people may, and probably 
will, be respected academics in their own fields 
but they have the desire and ability to range 
more widely.
;:v
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' (they are) moved not by profit or 
reward but by love for and unquenchable 
interest in the larger picture, in 
making connections across lines and 
barriers, in refusing to be tied down 
to a speciality, in caring for ideas 
and values despite the restrictions of 
a profession.' [13]
Such people have the ability to resist agendas 
laid down by governments (and Said describes at 
some length how such agendas are set) . - He
concludes this section:
'Every intellectual has an audience and 
a constituency. The issue is whether 
the audience is there to be satisfied, 
and hence a client to be kept happy, or 
whether it is there to be challenged, 
and hence stirred into outright 
opposition, or mobilised into greater 
democratic participation in the 
society.' [14]
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with Said's final challenge in this lecture:
240
3 %
a
There is no doubt that Fromm's aim was to 
challenge his audience - albeit the challenge was 
muted because so often the argument was confused. 
He had a particular interest in the extension of 
democracy and one of his lesser known titles, The 
Revolution of Hope. is directly and specifically
aimed to that end.
He would score equally strongly when faced
'How does the individual address 
authority: as a professional
supplicant, or as its unrewarded, 
amateurish conscience?' [15]
By 'authority' Said is referring to those who 
have power over others and especially to the 
overriding power of the state. This has little 
to do with Fromm's understanding of 
'authoritarianism' as a personality defect - but 
like Fromm, he does see the dangers inherent in 
a too ready submission to authority, in whatever 
form it becomes manifest.
'The intellectual has to walk around, 
has to have space in which to stand and 
talk back to authority, since 
unquestioning subservience to authority 
in today's world is one of the greatest 
threats to an active and moral, 
intellectual life.' [16]
It is interesting to compare this with 
Schaar's assessment of Fromm's position on 
authority;
'The dictates of authority are wrong 
even when they may be good for the 
subject, because authority always has 
its own interests firmly in mind. The 
interests of the subject are secondary.
This violates the canon that no man 
should be treated as a means. It also 
violates Fromm's canon that we ought to 
love and care for others as ourselves. '
[17]
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There is no doubt that, overall, Fromm can 
be safely placed in the category of ' intellectual 
as social critic' in Said's terms. It now 
becomes necessary to consider whether he will 
meet Michael Walzer's criteria for the social 
critic as prophet.
2. The Social Critic as Prophet
Essential to an understanding of Walzer's 
argument on the social critic as prophet is his 
belief that morality derives from the 
interpretation of a dense moral culture which 
already exists.
Of the three possible approaches to moral 
philosophy which he identifies i.e. discovery, 
invention and interpretation, he considers that 
interpretation 'accords best with our everyday 
experience of morality.' [18]
The story of Moses might seem to provide an 
example of how the process of discovery operates.
In the legendary account, he goes up to the 
mountain, where he meets with YHWH, and returns 
with the ten commandments inscribed on tablets of 
stone.
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But even if this was so, (and the evidence would 
appear to be against it) it is unlikely that the 
content of these commandments was completely new 
to the desert wanderers. The more perceptive, at 
least, had surely learnt by bitter experience 
that an embattled and landless people could not 
afford to allow devisive behaviour such as theft, 
murder, false witness, covetousness and adultery 
among their own ranks. The Sabbath was part of 
Jewish culture as far back as the records go - as 
was the worship of YHWH. If worship of gods 
other than YHWH was not against the accepted 
tradition there would have been no reason for 
Moses' anger when he returned to find his people 
worshipping the golden calf. (Exodus 32)
It could be argued that the actual 
'discoveries' took place by experience,
gradually and piecemeal, before and during the 
desert experience and that what Moses did was to 
encapsulate the essence of the highest wisdom of 
his people and give it the force of divine law. 
Whoever gave us the ten commandments in their 
present form, the fact remains that to take an 
inchoate mass of communal experience and produce
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from it a moral code that is still relevant was 
an inspired achievement resulting from a profound 
spiritual experience that is not necessarily 
lessened by arguing for pre-existent moral 
knowledge.
of discovery was over and, thereafter, moral 
discussion took the form of interpretation of the 
laws already formulated.
In more recent times, attempts have been 
made to invent a morality relevant to 
contemporary conditions and devised on entirely
I
Be that as it may, Walzer's argument is that 
once the commandments had been given, the period 1
Î:
rational lines where,
6
'The end is a common life, where 
justice, or political virtue, or 
goodness, or some such other basic 
value would be realised,' [19]
But, as Walzer puts it,
%
Î
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It is doubtful whether such a position could be 
achieved in practice. However, the claim is 
that,
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'The crucial requirement of the design 
procedure is that it eventuate in 
agreement.' [20]
- a well-nigh impossible demand. Many efforts 
have been made to ensure that the inventor of the 
new morality is free from bias and able to speak 
for everyone. Walzer cites the Rawlsian approach 
which.
'has the nice result that it ceases to 
matter whether the constructive work or
legislative work is undertaken by one
ftor many people. Deprived of all 
knowledge of their standing in the 
social world, of their interests, 
values, talents and relationships, 
potential legislators are rendered, for 
the practical purposes at hand, 
identical.' [21]
I
Until such a perfect morality is achieved we 
get by as best we can with a set of values
As Walzer points out,
'The point of an invented morality is 
to provide what God and nature do not 
provide, a universal corrective for all 
the different social moralities.' [24]
Walzer is not convinced that this is necessary,
246
1:!
'the moral world we invent behind the 
veil of ignorance or through an 
ideologically uncluttered conversation 
is the only world we could invent, 
universally inhabitable, a world for 
all persons .... so we create a morality 
against which we can measure any 
person's life, any society's practices. 
[22]
'created by conversation, argument, and 
political negotiation in circumstances we 
might call social over long periods of 
time,' [23]
/ft
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and compares the homely values within which we
detachment, turn the the moral reality into an 
idealised type [as in the story of Moses].
Walzer's position can be summarised as
He then reaches the core of his argument :
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live with invented morality which he likens to 
the coldness and lack of individual character of 
a luxurious but impersonal hotel room. A better 
procedure would be to start from where we are 
and, by adapting the Rawlsian position of
Î
i:
follows:
The true path in moral philosophy can be compared 
roughly to the three branches of government:
1. Discovery resembles the work of the 
executive - to find, proclaim and then
■enforce the law.
.iInvention is legislative:Invention de novo is like 
constitutional legislation.
Minimalist legislation is more like the 
work of legal codification. 
Interpretation is the work of the 
judiciary.
'ft
a mass of conflicting laws and 
precedents.' [25]
248
Ï
A
-ft.
'The claim of interpretation is simply
■this: that neither discovery nor
invention is necessary because we 
already possess what they pretend to
.provide. Morality, unlike politics, 
does not require executive authority or 
systematic legislation. We do not have 
to discover the moral world because we 
have always lived there. We do not 
have to invent it because it has 
already been invented - though not in 
accordance with any philosophical 
method. No design procedure has 
governed its design and the result no 
doubt is disorganised and uncertain.
It is also very dense: the moral world 
has a lived-in quality.... Moral 
argument in such a setting is 
interpretive in character, closely 
resembling the work of a lawyer or 
judge who struggles to find meaning in
I
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In answer to the question 'Why should the 
moral morass be authoritative for philosophers?' 
Walzer insists that,
'the moralities we discover and invent 
always turn out, and always will turn 
out, remarkably similar to the morality 
we already have....
There are indeed discoveries and 
inventions - utilitarianism is one 
example - but the more novel these are 
the less likely they are to make for 
strong or even plausible arguments.
The experience of moral argument is 
best understood in the interpretive 
mode. What we do when we argue is to 
give an account of the actually 
existing morality. That morality is 
authoritative for us because it is only 
by virtue of its existence that we 
exist as the moral beings we are. [My 
italics] [26]
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the existing morality is not a means of
■supporting any existing political hegemony - its 3
It is important, however, that for Walzer
purpose is to act as a corrective'.
'The capacity for criticism always 
extends beyond the "needs" of the 
social structure itself and its 
dominant groups. I do not want to 
defend a fundamentalist position. The 
moral world and the social world are
At any one time the question morality poses 
is "What is the right thing for us, given our 
particular circumstances, to do?" The answer is 
invariably a matter of interpretation of the
situation and of the probable effects of
alternative courses of action. As with the
reading of a poem, the best reading is not the
sum of previous readings but the one that
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more or less coherent, but they are 
never more than more or less coherent. 
Morality is always potentially 
subversive of class and power.' [27]
.I
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provides new and persuasive insights - one that 
may challenge or confirm previous readings.
'And if we disagree with either 
confirmation or challenge, there is 
nothing to do but to go back to the 
"text" - the values, principles, codes 
and conventions that constitute the 
moral world - and to the "readers of 
the text"'. [28]
The "readers" are the effective authorities - but 
their interpretation is not inviolate - they may 
change their minds, the population of readers may 
change and the argument can always be reopened.
Fromm did not, in fact, discover a new 
morality, nor did he invent one, in spite of the 
elaborate structure he constructed from the 
insights of Marx, Freud and his own Jewish 
culture. - He did what all prophets do - he re­
presented the existing morality in terms which he 
thought were relevant to his own time. We 
already knew that love was better than hate, 
justice was better than injustice and that greed 
was one of the seven deadly sins. What Fromm
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'Social criticism is a social activity, 
"Social" has a pronominal and reflexive 
function, rather like "self" in "self-
did was to provide reassurance to people who were 
anxious about the apparent loss of the moral 
community that morality still mattered; and he 
provided a scientifically unsophisticated public 
with what sounded like a scientific argument in 
favour of the values they already held but which, 
for most of them, were no longer supported by a 
firm religious backing.
Unlike Said, Walzer saw the social critic as 
an 'insider'. His stipulative definition of 
social criticism runs as follows:
fft
criticism," which names subject and 
object at the same time. No doubt, 
societies do not criticise themselves; 
social critics are individuals, but 
they are also, most of the time, 
members, speaking in public to other 
members who join in the speaking and 
whose speech constitutes a collective 
reflection upon the conditions of 
collective life.' [29]
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Marginality does not necessarily make for 
detachment - it could be
'a distorting factor, undercutting his 
(the prophet's) capacity for effective 
judgement' [30]
Nor does Walzer accept the conventional view
that '
'the critic is not really a marginal 
figure; he is - he has made himself 
into - an outsider, a spectator, a 
"total stranger", a man from Mars. He 
derives a kind of critical authority 
from the distance he establishes.' (my 
italics) [31]
Instead he proposes an alternative view of 
the critic who is 'one of us', [32]
'This is the style of.... Gandhi in 
India, of Tawney and Orwell in Britain. 
Social criticism, for such people, is
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an internal argument. The outsider can 
become a social critic only if he 
manages to get himself inside, enters 
imaginatively into local practices and 
arrangements.' [33]
Both Said and Fromm are exiles who have 
become sufficiently 'naturalised' in America to 
become social critics in these terms. Of the 
two, Fromm had the lesser adjustment to make 
because of the close affinities between western 
Europe and the U.S.A.
[The discrepancy between the positions of Said 
and Walzer is more evident than real. Both 
throw light on the ambivalent position of the 
social critic, who cannot function prophetically 
unless he is an 'insider' and yet must have the
vision to see further than his contemporaries. 
The wider experience of the naturalised exile may 
be an asset but it is not essential to this 
enhanced vision.]
Said is probably correct, in any case, in
254
1
¥
Ii
pointing out that the outsider may be more 
immediately aware of the need for social change 
(as Amos, the Judean, recognised the ills of 
Israel), though I would agree with Walzer that 
it is necessary to get inside a specific culture 
before one is in a position to judge fairly and 
make positive suggestions as to how the necessary 
changes are to be brought about.
One could not argue, however, that Fromm has 
insufficient knowledge of the culture he wished 
to change, nor, I believe, that many of his 
critisms of capitalist society were invalid - the 
problem lies in his belief that Marxism and 
Freudianism had anything to offer, morally, that 
was not already present in our culture, [though 
Freud did add to our understanding of sexual 
morality].
Walzer considers that:
'Opposition, far more than detachment, 
is what determines the shape of social 
criticism. The critic takes sides in 
actual or latent conflicts; he sets
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himself up against the prevailing 
political forces.' [34]
This was self-evidently true of Fromm, as was his 
wish, in Walzer's terms, 'that things should go 
well' [35] with his adopted country. This point 
is essential to Walzer's definition of the social 
critic as prophet,
'He is not an enemy, even when he is 
fiercely opposed to this or that 
prevailing practice or institutional 
arrangement. His criticism does not 
require either detachment or enmity, 
because he finds a warrant for 
critical engagement in the idealism, 
even if it is a hypocritical idealism, 
of the existing moral world.' [36]
For example, there would be no point in Hosea's 
condemnation, [4:2]
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'there is no fidelity, no tenderness, 
no knowledge of God in the country, 
only perjury and lies, slaughter, theft, 
adultery and violence, murder after 
murder....'
if he did not care for the well-being of his
However, Walzer continues:
'The problem with disconnected 
criticism, and thus with criticism that 
derives from newly discovered or 
invented moral standards, is that it
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people, or if he did not assume that the people 
should know better. Indeed, this passage clearly 
evokes Moses' teaching in the ten commandments.
Nor would there be any foundation for Isaiah's
■lament for Jerusalem [1:21-28] if he did not care 
deeply about the situation he found there.
'What a harlot she has become 
the faithful city,
Zion, that was all justice!'[1: 21]
J1SÏ1
Fromm was able to appeal to the popular reader of
He failed to see the inconsistency involved 
in advocating Marxism and anti-authoritarianism 
simultaneously.
Walzer invites comparison with Alasdair 
MacIntyre when he claims that:
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presses its practitioners toward manipulation and 
compulsion,' [37]
One reason for this, and it applies to 
utilitarianism and Rawlism as much as to Marxism, 
is that they meet with resistance as soon as they 
become counter intuitive, [as, for example, when 
Singer approves infanticide]. When this happens, 
pressure of some kind is needed if the new 
standards are to be implemented. Walzer is 
correct in insisting that the morality that is 
effective, is the shared morality embedded in the 
culture and traditions of a particular people.
Î
his time only insofar as he reinforced that 
shared morality and showed where contemporary
practice had departed from it.
I
_
He insists that contemporary society has become 
so disordered that;
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'Social criticism is less the practical 
offspring of scientific knowledge than 
the educated cousin of common
complaint. We become critics
naturally, as it were, by elaborating
....on existing moralities and telling
stories about a society more just than.
though never entirely different from,
■
our own.' [38]
!
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MacIntyre bemoans the loss in contemporary 
society of just that sense of shared life and 
tradition, upon which Walzer's argument is based, 
and which he describes, in After Virtue, thus;
a  
, - :'A living tradition, then, is an 
historically extended, socially 
embedded argument, and an argument in 
part about the goods which constitute 
that tradition.' [39] 'ft'
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'What we possess.... are the fragments 
of a conceptual scheme, parts of which 
lack those contexts from which their 
significance derived,' [40]
MacIntyre sees life from the viewpoint of 
the intelligentsia in the larger cultural centres
of the developed world. This is a large and
influential section of the world's population, 
but it is not the whole of it. Many tribes in 
undeveloped countries continue their traditional 
life undisturbed, but more than this, MacIntyre 
underestimates the extent to which communities 
within larger urban areas, and even more among 
the rural populations, still cling to shared 
basic moral standards as the norm, adapting them 
if need be to meet the need of changing
circumstances. There is not space to debate
this here. MacIntyre makes a strong theoretical 
case and he has perceived a dangerous tendency, 
but I do not believe that we have reached the 
stage where Walzer's whole position is 
invalidated.
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original sense, is at the heart of
There is no doubt that the narratives of the 
prophets have operated in precisely this fashion 
in both the Jewish and Christian traditions.
Walzer regards the Old Testament prophets as 
the earliest examples of social critic, as he 
defines the term.
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MacIntyre and Walzer share a belief in the 
importance of narrative in the maintenance of 
these shared traditions :
'there is no way to give us an 
understanding of any society, including 
our own, except through the stock of 
stories which constitute its initial 
dramatic resources. Mythology, in its
Ithings.... And so too, of course, is 
that moral tradition from heroic 
society to its medieval heirs according
-to which the telling of stories has a 
key part in educating us into the
ftvirtues.' [41]
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writings of the prophets are perhaps the earliest 
known examples of political pamphleteering and
I
However, he considers that Weber goes too
far when he describes them as demagogues,
'that is not quite right, for though 
the prophets spoke to the people and, 
arguably, on their behalf, and though 
they spoke with the fierceness and 
anger we conventionally attribute to 
demagogues, they do not seem to have 
sought a popular following or ever to 
have aspired to political office.' [42]
However, he is inclined to agree that the
I
thus can be regarded as exemplars for the type of 
social critic he had in mind. (Weber instances 
Isaiah 22:15f and 'the written curse which 
Jeremiah placed upon Semachiah'.) [43]
Walzer points out that the prophet does not 
produce radically new teaching - rather, he 
refers back continually to what people already 
knew but failed to practice.
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Like the prophets Fromm reinforced what people 
already knew. His 'humanistic ethics' does not, 
in fact, produce a new morality, rather it 
postulates a different reason for being moral.
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'For the most part, they disclaim 
originality, not only in the obvious
sense that they attribute their message 
to God. It is more important that they 
continually refer themselves to the 
epic history and the moral teaching of 
the Torah: "He hath showed thee, 0
man, what is good" (Micah 6.8) The
■past tense is significant. The
prophets assume the previous messages, 
the divine "showings", the immediacy of
history and law in the minds of their 
listeners.... They speak to a large
audience, and for all their anger, they
■seem to take that audience for granted.
They assume, writes Johannes Lindblom,
"that their words could be immediately 
understood and accepted" - not, 
however, that they would be.' [44]
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We are to love our neighbour because this will 
produce the best results for humanity, not 
because it is part of a set of moral laws laid 
down by those in power:
'The paralysing effect of power does 
not rest only on the fear it arouses, 
but equally on an implicit promise - 
the promise that those in possession of 
power can protect and take care of the 
"weak" who submit to it, that they can 
free man from the burden of uncertainty 
and of responsibility for himself by 
guaranteeing order and by assigning the 
individual a place in the order which 
makes him feel secure.' [45]
As Fromm sees it, 'freedom, the ability to 
preserve one's integrity against power, is the 
basic condition for morality' [46] - there is
truth in this, nor would the biblical prophets 
have disagreed. They believed that their 
authority lay in their ability to articulate the 
will of YHWH in their own situation, and
ft
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frequently this involved a challenge to those who 
held the religious and political power in their 
time. Amos' tirade against those in authority in 
Israel who 'trample on the heads of ordinary 
people and push the poor out of their path' [2:7] 
is a case in point. But whatever the theory 
behind the morality, unless the result of the 
prophetic message is to produce a change in 
direction in those who hear the message, the
prophecy has failed.
Fromm made no more impression on the ills of 
his time than the biblical prophets did on 
theirs.
Walzer underlines his view of the prophet as
'insider' by comparing Amos (arguably an outsider 
to the Israelites - but an 'insider' insofar as :
Israel and Judah shared a common theological 
tradition) - with Jonah, who was sent to Ninevah 
as an 'outsider' - 'where his appeal to Israel's 
history and law would obviously make no sense'.
[47]
Amos, in the confrontation with Amaziah 
(7.10-17) had the advantage of being able to 
appeal to a shared religious tradition against
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the priest’s advocacy of reasons of state, unlike 
Jonah who can appeal only to a minimalist 
'international religious law' which Weber had 
suggested could be 'presupposed as valid among 
the Palestinian peoples'. [48]
Because Jonah is an 'outsider', his words 
lack the added meanings which derive from a 
shared cultural background,
'..this is prophecy without poetry, 
without resonance, background allusion 
or concrete detail'. [49]
The story tells us more of the lesson God taught 
Jonah than of the conditions in Ninevah - and 
this, no doubt, is the purpose it serves in the 
Jewish scriptures.
In Fear of Freedom, Fromm is delivering to 
the Western allies a message that he has derived 
from his experience in Germany. This does not 
detract from its 'prophetic' quality, since the 
cultures of western Europe and the U.S.A. were 
not dissimilar, the aberrant growth in Nazi 
Germany was one that could easily be repeated
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stresses the part the prophets played in the 
creation of that tradition:
i,'
elsewhere, and indeed it had been - in Italy and 
Spain. His situation, however, was not parallel 
to that of Amos, to get a more exact parallel one 
would have to imagine an American or one of the 
allies who had travelled to preach in Germany 
before the outbreak of the war.
Though Walzer continues to stress the 
importance of the shared tradition, he also
'the coherence of Israelite religion is 
more a consequence than a precondition 
of the work of the prophets. Their 
prophecies, together with the writing 
of the Deuteronomic school, begin the 
creation of something we might call 
normative Judaism. It is important to 
stress the pre-existing moral and legal 
codes, the sense of a common past, the 
depth of popular religiosity. But all 
this was still theologically inchoate, 
highly contentious, radically 
pluralistic in form. In fact, the
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parasitic upon the past, but they also 
give shape to the past upon which they 
are parasitic. [50]
Fromm, too, was parasitic on many sources 
which he attempted to weave together to form a
own time. The biblical prophets, however, sought 
to serve one people and one tradition within a 
relatively limited geographical area - the stage 
on which Fromm had to work covered the western
'Just as we need to resist the 
portrayal of ancient Israel as a 
special case of moral coherence, so we
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prophets pick and choose among the 
available materials.... They are
■J,:
i :
3:;:
democratic moral structure of ideas to serve his
I
world, a melting pot of peoples and traditions
with a further 3,000 years of history behind them 
and change on an unprecedented scale in front of 
them. It is less easy to be a true prophet under 
these conditions.
This has to be borne in mind as Walzer 
continues :
Moreover, the same cultural background is
available to both sides of the argument.
%
need to resist the portrayal of the 
prophets as peculiar, eccentric, and
lonely individuals.......
Interpretation as I have described it, 
as the prophets practiced it is a 
common activity’. [51]
'...the same resources - authoritative 
texts, memories, values, practices, 
conventions - are available to social 
critics and defenders of the status 
quo.' [52]
Schaar and Springborg call upon texts that 
were equally available to Fromm to refute his 
arguments - they assume they share the same 
academic tradition. The situation becomes 
confused because Fromm tried to have it both 
ways, to write popular texts drawing from his 
academic background. This is notoriously
■Ï
difficult to do, and it cannot be said that Fromm
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a whole, however, is a surely a deep 
concern for "the hurt of
of his concern'. [53]
This, surely, was the case with Fromm. His deep 
concern for the well-being of all men was real.
'111 ;e
5has succeeded. His arguments too often do not 
stand up to close scrutiny by his peers yet his 
style is insufficiently unpretentious to be 
accepted as simply 'popular'.
Referring to the account of the prophet, 
Amos, Walzer concludes,
'The animating passion of the book as
t
Joseph"... .Amos is a critic not only 
because of his anger but also because
Whose prophet?
The biblical prophet could appeal to a 
shared tradition of religious belief when he 
referred his listeners to the commands of YHWH. 
Such an appeal was not open to the agnostic 
Fromm. Yet he did repeatedly refer to authority
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»to validate his arguments (in spite of his 
thunderings against authority). In his case it 
has been argued that his authority was Marx, and 
that therefore, he is best understood as a 
prophet of Karl Marx. Yet this is to
oversimplify,
'There is no God but Marx - and Fromm 
is his prophet' 
is not an assertion that can stand beside the 
traditional reference to Allah, in the same way
■ias one could say of Amos,
'there is no God but YHWH - and Amos is 
his prophet'.
In renouncing YHWH, Fromm had perhaps taken on 
board a pantheon of lesser gods, among whom Marx 
was predominant.
Certainly, by the time The Sane Society was 
published the clear prophetic voice warning 
against the dangers of authoritarianism has been 
replaced by a more complex message based on post- 
Freudian insights and Marxist ideology. Fromm is 
too critical to be considered seriously as a 
prophet of Freud, however much he acknowledges 
his debt to his predecessor.
■ i
1:1
'A crucial turning point in that 
earlier history occurred when men and 
women of good will turned aside from
a
I
The argument that he is a prophet of Marx 
has more substance - but Marx, himself, is 
frequently considered to be a prophet, and to be 
a prophet of a prophet is to dilute the term 
beyond useful meaning.
I would prefer to describe Fromm as a 3"
disciple of Marx and, to a lesser extent, of 
Freud, and to argue that increasingly, as time 
wore on - the original prophetic message became 
elaborated to form a uniquely Frommian thesis 
compounded of a rationalised Judaism; Freudianisn 
revised, in all but its most basic tenets; and a 
sanitised Marxism. However, he still propounded 
the message with an earnestness that at least 
warranted the title of 'prophet as social 
critic'.
In addition, his work has to be seen in the 
context of the situation that concerns MacIntyre 
where, in a post-religious age we have lost 
belief in a single moral code and are faced with 
a plethora of competing moralities.
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could be sustained so that the moral 
life might survive the coming ages of
It is MacIntyre's position that we can do no 
other than to emulate them, though our case is 
even more desperate as,
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the task of shoring up the Roman 
imperium and ceased to identify the
continuity of civility and moral 
community with the maintenance of that 
imperium. What they set themselves to ■ ■achieve instead - often without fully
recognising what they were doing - was
■the construction of new forms of
community within which the moral life
tbarbarism and darkness.' [54]
‘■j
4I
:
'This time the barbarians are not 
waiting at the frontier; they have 
already been governing us for quite 
some time.' [55]
Revolution of Hope - where the aim was to
We are in the very midst of the crisis 
of modern man. We do not have too much 
time left. If we do not begin now, it 
will probably be too late. But there 
is hope - because there is a real 
possibility that man can reassert 
himself, and that he can make the 
technological society human.
"It is not up to us to complete the
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Fromm's work could be seen as part of this 
effort to maintain the traditional values by 
building up moral communities within which they 
could be sustained. Like MacIntyre, he wanted the 
rebuilding process to begin now and was not 
prepared to wait for the dark times to pass. The 
Sane society was intended to encourage the
promotion of such moral communities, as was The
produce :
'the transformation of society which 
would allow the individual to find ways 
of immediate participation and action, 
and give an answer to the question,
■"What can I do?"
’:4'
task, but we have no right to abstain 
from it".' [56]
It is not inappropriate that this thesis should 
end with a saying from The Avoth which is to be 
found in all Jewish prayerbooks.
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IAPPENDIX 1.
Fromm's work listed by date of copyright - or by 
date of first publication.
1941. ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM.
1942. FEAR OF FREEDOM.
1949. MAN FOR HIMSELF. (First pub. in Gt
Britain)
1952. THE FORGOTTEN LANGUAGE
1965. (ed) SOCIALIST HUMANISM: AN INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM.
1966. YOU SHALL BE AS GODS.
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1950. PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RELIGION. s
1956. THE SANE SOCIETY.
1957. THE ART OF LOVING. (First pub. in
England.)
1959. SIGMUND FREUD'S MISSION.
1960. ZEN BUDDHISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS with
D.T.Suzuki and R. de Martino.
1961. Der Friede: Idee und Verwirklichung: (ed)
THE SEARCH FOR PEACE (Bilingual volume.)
1961. MARX'S CONCEPT OF MAN.
1962. BEYOND THE CHAINS OF ILLUSION.
1963. THE DOGMA OF CHRIST AND OTHER ESSAYS.
1965. THE HEART OF MAN. (first pub. in Great
Britain.
I:_
1968. THE REVOLUTION OF HOPE.
1969. THE NATURE OF MAN.
1970. SOCIAL CHARACTER IN A MEXICAN VILLAGE. 
(With M. Jacoby).
1970, THE CRISIS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS.
1973. THE ANATOMY OF HUMAN DESTRUCTIVENESS. 
1976. TO HAVE OR TO BE.
1978. THE WELL-BEING OF MAN IN SOCIETY.
1980. THE GREATNESS AND LIMITATION OF FREUD'S 
THOUGHT.
1980. THE WORKING CLASS IN WEIMAR GERMANY,
(ed. Wolfgang Bonss.)
1981. ON DISOBEDIENCE AND OTHER ESSAYS.
1993. THE ART OF BEING (ed. Rainer Funk.)
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